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Introduction 
Since the beginning of the 1990s Russia’s labour market has experienced a 
period of painful transformation. The old Soviet system with full employ-
ment, equalised wage setting and the state as the single employer was abol-
ished. This market transition created tremendous challenges for the Russian 
workers because of the loss of state-guaranteed employment and the appear-
ance of a wide range of private employers with significantly varying wages 
and labour conditions. 
The transition of the Russian labour market from a centralised system dif-
fers from what happened in the other former socialist countries of Eastern 
and Central Europe. Despite a sharp drop in industrial production, the level 
of employment remained high, but the price for that was a very low level of 
labour compensation and widespread wage arrears.1 
Part of the excessive manufacturing labour force has been absorbed by 
the shadow economy and the public sector. The public sector employment 
has grown considerably from the Soviet time despite the shrinking role of 
the state.2 
The labour income distribution, very even in the Soviet Union, has be-
come extremely unequal. Some companies pay high labour compensations, 
complying with tax and labour legislation, while most workers receive wage 
close to or even below subsistence level. However, officially registered 
labour incomes are this low partly due to widespread tax evasion and 
shadow labour relationships. 
Shadow activities are inherent for the majority of Russian private enter-
prises, so that informal employment is closely connected not only to unreg-
istered work in its entirety, but also to the partial evasion of labour tax pay-
ments. Unregistered employment and labour compensation are prevalent and 
morally justified in society. Tax evasion and work without labour contracts 
became the survival strategy for many Russian companies and individuals. 
Despite the fact that shadow relationships generate numerous acute social 
problems, they help dampen the problems of the population’s employment 
and incomes, and perhaps also to create the base for small business devel-
opment. The extent of the shadow labour market is determined by a number 
of factors, including the extent of the shadow economy and tax evasion as a 
whole, the development of labour legislation, and the social security of the 
labour market institutions. 
This report considers a developed urban economy with a closed regional 
labour market with different employment opportunities for a worker. It is 
represented by three sectors: the honest (advanced) sector, the shadow (hid-
den) sector and the public sector, since the traditional division of the Russian 
labour market between ”old” (former Soviet enterprises) and “new” (newly 
emerged firms) working places gradually becomes less and less meaningful. 
                                                     
1  Blanchard (1997). 
2  Russia in figures (2001). 
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Due to efficiency wage considerations, firms that belong to the advanced 
sector pay their workers more than the clearing wage in the market, and 
hence ration employment. The only source of the wages for the public sec-
tor’s employees is taxes paid by the advanced sector, and therefore payrolls 
in the two sectors are directly connected. Wages in the shadow sector are 
determined by employment there, but wage promises are uncertain, and 
workers take this uncertainty into account in their employment decisions. 
Unlike the public sector workers, workers in the shadow sector have an 
opportunity of being hired by a firm from the advanced sector. Also employ-
ees in the honest sector can count on maximum pension, while workers in 
the remaining two sectors should be satisfied with the minimum one. Migra-
tion between the public and shadow sectors is free, and therefore the sectors’ 
incomes are equalised in equilibrium. This setting is captured by the three-
sectoral model in the Harris-Todaro tradition, that allows showing the causes 
and consequences of labour redistribution. It is basically a static model: 
workers make the employment decision once and for good. 
A solution to the model provides us with the opportunity to make some 
predictions concerning labour market behaviour in the changing environ-
ment; in particular, how basic characteristics of the market respond to differ-
ent policies that can be implemented by the government. It has been shown 
in the model that expansion of the advanced sector is accompanied by 
enlargement of the shadow sector, and it imposes some restrictions on gov-
ernment policy. The model demonstrates that better technologies reduce 
employment in the advanced sector at the expense of the public sector and 
increase incomes in both sectors. Higher tax retards the advanced sector’s 
development and keeps the wages there on a high level, and increases 
shadow sector and income inequality between the workers in the various 
sectors. 
The most topical reforms on the Russian government agenda, e.g. 
administrative, pension and tax, affect directly the labour market. The model 
provides us with the possibility to make some predictions concerning the 
consequences of the main measures of the reforms. Retirement pension may 
be presented and valued as a specific non-marketable call option position, 
with wage as a basic asset. Realisation of this option and consequently a 
worker’s employment and savings behaviour depend upon the pension sys-
tem parameters. It is shown that the higher the pension parameters the higher 
the value of employment in every sector, with lowest growth in the public 
one, whereas increase in the pension differential makes work in the 
advanced sector more rewarding and consequently the shadow sector’s 
employment rises due to the increased value of an opportunity of being 
employed in the advanced sector. Higher minimum pension and higher re-
tirement age will increase the size of the shadow sector, while the pension 
differential, as well as a higher replacement ratio will decrease it. 
Throughout the 1990s the government tended to emphasise the signifi-
cance of proper administrative measures against the shadow sector. The 
model shows that punitive measures against the shadow sector decrease 
shadow employment and the level of production there, but simultaneously 
lead to lower incomes in both the shadow and public sectors, and hence 
higher income inequality in the economy. Therefore, this kind of policies 
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may be applied in practice only on a rather limited scale. It is also worth to 
emphasise the importance of the co-ordination problem between various 
branches and levels of the government responsible for realisation of different 
policies. 
The report is organised as follows. The first part aims to highlight the 
main aspects of the Russian labour market development and some peculiari-
ties of the shadow employment in Russia. The second part presents the 
model, and applications of possible government policies for the labour mar-
ket are discussed in the third part. The last part concludes. 
 

A labour market in transition 
Key features of the Russian labour market of the 1990s 
The economic transition of the 1990s was very painful for the majority of 
Russians. Guaranteed employment, a high level of social protection and 
equalised labour incomes gave place to wild market challenges such as 
employment insecurity and huge income inequality. The contraction of the 
economy and structural shifts made a lot of labour skills obsolete and created 
an extremely uneven development of industries and regions. Although this 
pattern was observed in every transition economy, the way of adaptation of 
Russia's labour market was quite different and featured as follows: 
 
• A relatively high level of employment despite sharp drops in industrial 
production.3 Excessive employment before the radical market reforms 
in combination with the shrinkage of the economic activity produced 
much less unemployment than in other former socialist countries. 
Figure 1 illustrates this phenomenon: unemployment does not grow 
with falling production. 
• A low level of officially registered labour incomes. The strong contrac-
tion of the labour compensation cannot be a sole explanation. Different 
sources show that the decline in the registered wage was reflected in 
the huge growth of hidden remuneration, determined by a burdensome 
labour legislation and an excessive payroll taxation. 
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Figure 1: Registered unemployment (thou. persons) and GDP (in USD). 
Source: Russia in figures (2001) 
                                                     
3  See Clarke (1998). 
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• Growth in informal employment. The relationships of the worker and 
the employer changed after the reform started. Often only the verbal 
contract is used, and the worker is not only deprived of the pension 
and other benefits entitlements but also cannot certify her4 qualifica-
tion and the wage. 
• A large differential in registered compensation across companies. 
Some companies in Russia prefer to pay much higher labour compen-
sation than what is necessary to attract workers with similar levels of 
qualification and therefore ration their employment.5 Companies of 
this group not only take the higher direct labour costs, but also sign the 
official labour contracts and bear all corresponding indirect costs (pay-
roll taxes, labour turnover costs etc.). The group consists of the tech-
nologically advanced firms, often with foreign capital, and the compa-
nies of the export-oriented petroleum and metallurgical sectors. For 
the former their profitability crucially depends on the high quality of 
production and hence small negligence by the workers may turn out to 
be disastrous for the firms’ reputation and profits. Since control is 
costly or impossible to implement, such firms offer a premium relative 
to the wage in the rest of the economy in order to motivate their work-
ers to show a highest possible level of diligence. Besides that, large 
Russian companies heavily depend on the relationships with the 
authorities, and being also too big to avoid scrutiny in the form of the 
tax and labour inspections, have to comply with the regulations. 
• A huge growth in the public sector employment. The data shows 
significant growth in the regional public sector employment, espe-
cially those of the regional authorities. Real necessities of the authori-
ties hardly explain this growth, but at the same time the following 
political and social explanations by experts look quite plausible. The 
local governments care for employment in the region and try to buy 
the loyalty of public servants, and thus tend to increase public 
employment. A relatively low level of salaries accompanies the re-
sulting overemployment in Russia’s public sector. 
Issues of hidden employment 
Labour market background  
The central government in the Soviet Union was the sole employer and 
strictly controlled labour relationships by regulating the size and structure of 
the workforce, as well as wages for every enterprise.6 The labour legislation 
stipulated high and costly protection of an employee. The wage rates were 
set according to the unified system of tariffs, aimed to equalise wages and 
thereby compress the differentiation in population incomes. Enterprises were 
not able to set high wages but always offered their employees a wide array 
of cheap or free services in the form of kindergartens, sport and recreation 
                                                     
4  For pure convenience here and in the following text she for a worker and he for an 
employer are used. 
5  Mikhalev and Bjergsten (1995). 
6  About the Soviet social contract, see Cook (1993). 
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facilities, support in education and so on. Hence the direct pay was often 
considered only as the minor part of the whole compensation package. Full 
employment was proclaimed as the crucial achievement of socialism, but 
actually was possible only in a situation of soft budget constraints for enter-
prises. 
It was commonplace in the Soviet Union that full employment was sus-
tained artificially. The excessive character of employment and the shrinkage 
of Russia’s economy due to the market reforms have caused considerable 
unemployment and official recognition of it is a social problem. A massive 
drop in industrial production made labour market experts expect tremendous 
growth in unemployment after the radical market reforms started. That was 
the case in Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries but did not happen 
in Russia: the scale of exposed unemployment turned out to be less than 
labour market experts expected, and much lower than in other transition 
countries.7 From 1991 to 1999 employment in the Russian economy fell 
from 74 million individuals to 63.2 million, a decline of about 15 per cent, 
whereas the average output plunged by more than 50 per cent8.  
Yet in the CEE economies output declined by only 20-30 per cent and 
unemployment sharply rose to a double-digit level. Empirically, the response 
in the unemployment level in Eastern Europe was much more pronounced to 
the output fall than in Russia. 
Researchers emphasise the paradoxical development of the Russian 
labour market and that the way of adaptation of Russia’s labour market dur-
ing the transition period differs from their peers in Eastern Europe. Russian 
enterprises prefer to adjust through wage correction, not through the number 
of employed. The data concerning the dynamics of wages in transitional 
countries indicates a substantial fall in real wages across all former socialist 
economies, but the magnitude of this fall varies between Eastern European 
countries and Russia. While real wages in the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland and Slovakia fell by only 30 per cent, in Russia they fell by almost 
70 per cent.9 Considering the fact that around 70 per cent of the workers in 
Russia report that their employers owe them wage arrears, that drop is even 
deeper. Layard and Richter, in the middle of the 1990s, referred to the ‘Rus-
sian way’ of adjustment, and they wrote that Russia in effect had much more 
real wage flexibility than many other countries, due to more factors than 
solely hyperinflation. Despite the shrinkage in economic activity, the rate of 
hiring remained rather high, and outflow into unemployment was relatively 
modest. 
Huge wage arrears became an important display of this flexibility. 
Although the reforms removed the administrative constraints on the enter-
prises’ personnel policy and at the same time introduced hard budget con-
straints, companies often preferred to keep more workers than the current 
level of production demanded and simultaneously accumulated wage arrears, 
since dismissal of redundant workers is legally difficult and associated with 
high severance payments, hiring costs are high, while wage arrears are 
                                                     
7  See e.g. Commander, McHale, Yemtsov (1995). 
8  Rossiisky Statisticheskii Yezhegodnik (1999). 
9  Kuddo (1999). 
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almost not penalised. The companies anticipating higher demand for their 
production may choose such a behaviour. 
The share of labour income in GDP and in the total incomes of individu-
als decreased considerably throughout the 1990s.10 The drop in wages was 
partly compensated by the emancipation of other legal sources of incomes 
(entrepreneurship incomes, rentals etc.). This tendency was common for all 
transition economies, but while in Eastern European countries the share of 
labour incomes declined by only 5-10 per cent, Russia experienced the two-
fold drop. It provides reason to believe that labour compensation is not 
declared in full. 
According to some surveys,11 new Russian enterprises are very flexible 
in setting their wage rates. These firms are often engaged in semiformal 
employment where only a small fraction of compensation is recorded. Some 
of them constitute a privileged sector of the economy with extremely high 
labour compensations. For employees of such companies their wages are 
reckoned to be as much as ten to twenty times greater than the average wage 
in the country. The gap is much wider than in any other transitional or 
developed economies, including the USA. The difference in skills alone 
cannot explain why identical jobs are compensated so differently, and usu-
ally labour economists explain this phenomenon by union bargaining. This 
explanation is hardly applicable to Russia since unions are weak and often 
consider themselves a part of the administration. However, companies in 
some industries enjoy a substantial degree of market power or can extract 
rents from natural resources, and we will have to explain why managers are 
interested in sharing rents with their workers. 
Brainerd (1995) believes this is so because Russia’s privatisation strategy 
resulted in insider ownership for a majority of privatised enterprises, and 
therefore workers’ wages also include (explicitly or implicitly) incomes from 
stock ownership. It could be a part of the explanation if the rights of minor 
shareholders in Russia were protected. Managers and major shareholders do 
not reckon with workers as well as with other minor shareholders, and there 
were numerous cases of how wage arrears were arranged (by the administra-
tion) purposely in order to make workers sell the shares they got during the 
privatisation.12 Thus, wages may even suffer because of stock ownership. 
On the other hand, Brainerd asserts that some of the employees with es-
pecially high compensations possess residual or unobservable ‘skills’ bey-
ond measurable human capital endowments. They include readiness to take 
risks, connections, and the luck of being in the right place at the right time 
among other elements. In some senses, she writes, the Russian economy is 
like a lottery, with large rents accruing to those well positioned to take the 
advantage of opportunities – but also with substantial losses for those who 
draw a losing number. We can observe a drastic variation in wages across 
the economy, which indicates that the labour market does not work properly. 
As Gimpelson and Lippold (2000) point out, the transition economy in Rus-
sia with limited competition, poor regulation and other distortions offered an 
environment ripe for all types of rent seeking. Although such rents could 
                                                     
10  Russian Economic Barometer (1999). 
11  See, e.g., V.Gimpelson, D.Lippold (2001). 
12  Denisova, Friebel, Sadovnikova (1998). 
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potentially erode as arbitrage effects developed along with some increases in 
competition, this did not happen on a large scale. The limited mobility of the 
population and the huge physical area of the country slow the process of 
wage levelling across the economy as a whole, and we can consider the 
labour market of a particular region without loss of generality. 
Public employment 
Many observers noticed a particular feature of the Russian labour market – 
sharp growth of public employment in the 1990s despite the economic crisis 
and tremendous privatisation. Employment in the state-owned enterprises 
fell from more than four-fifths of total employment in 1990 to little more 
than one-third in 1998. Whereas total employment dropped by 12 per cent, 
employment in the public administration (i.e. an additional 1.2 million 
employees13) and in education and health care grew contrary to all expecta-
tions. Even employment in government administration at the federal level 
has fallen in Russia since the beginning of the transition, and the growth of 
regional government employment was considerably higher than just to com-
pensate for this fall,14 ranging from 19.5 per cent in Tyumen Oblast to 54 per 
cent in Ingushetia. Between 1990 and 1998 registered growth in education, 
culture and art was rather modest, from 9.6 per cent of the total to 11.2 per 
cent, while in health care, sports and social protection employment increased 
remarkably. This tendency, illustrated by Figure 2, opposes downsizing in 
public health and education in most transition countries. Growth in employ-
ment has been accompanied by a sharp fall in the level of real salaries. In the 
cited paper, Gimpelson and others assert the following determinants of the 
public employment size: 
 
• Contrary to Wagner’s law, there is even negative correlation between 
development (measured either by per capita gross regional product or 
urbanisation) and public employment, so the poorest Russian regions 
have the highest level of public employment. 
• Public employment in a given region is affected by regional political 
events (gubernatorial or other elections). 
• Regional authorities try to absorb an excessive labour force due to the 
growth in local unemployment, despite their limited financial abilities. 
According to an analysis by Gimpelson, Treisman and Monusova, “in 
regions with higher unemployment rates and especially in those that 
had suffered a particularly sharp increase in unemployment that year, 
public employment increased significantly. A one percentage point 
jump in unemployment in a given year was associated with 0.09 per-
centage point increase in public employment, other things equal”. The 
matter concerns extra employment in education, culture, art, science, 
health care, sports and social protection, but also public administra-
tion. 
                                                     
13  All preceding figures are from Gimpelson, Treisman and Monusova (2000).  
14  According to Rossiisky Statistichesky Yezhegodnik 1999, employment in public 
administration in regions other than Moscow grew by about 1.25 million workers between 
1992 and 1998.  
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• The level of public employment is also determined by budget con-
straints – financial opportunities of the regional authorities. 
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Figure 2: Employment in different sectors (as a share of  total employment). 
Source: Russia in figures 2001.  
The underground sector and shadow employment  
There are numerous opportunities for Russian companies to operate illegally, 
and most of them are discussed in the investigation “Neformalnyi Sektor v 
Rossiyskoi Ekonomike”.15 Almost all companies are involved in various 
forms of unregistered economic activities, tax evasion and breach of labour 
law requirements. 16 Economic activity without official registration was 
abundantly present in the Soviet Union long before the market reforms, and 
remains in modern Russia. Recent figures show that medical services in state 
clinics are paid informally by 25 per cent of the respondents, repairing of 
apartments by 55 per cent, funeral services by 61 per cent.17 
According to Schneider and Enste (1998), every unregistered economic 
activity involves the labour market to some extent: directly (i.e. a rise in the 
number of hidden workers) or indirectly (i.e. tax evasion). The shadow 
labour market includes all cases where an employee occupies a shadow 
economy position regardless of whether she has a legal position as well. 
In the informal sector of the labour market I include workers having un-
registered primary/secondary job, being self-employed and employees of 
small business units18 that avoid registration and do not pay taxes. A person 
may work without a labour contract (unofficially) due to either the type of 
economic activity of the employing firm or the absence of a work permit 
                                                     
15  Dolgopiatova (1998). 
16  Notice that apart from tax crimes we do no consider criminal activities. 
17  Survey by the Centre for Studies of Illegal Economic Activity (1999). 
18  Household-owned enterprises or small firms within large companies are the most 
widespread ones. 
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(e.g. military men19 or immigrants). Informal labour relationships may take 
different forms but since the wage received by an unregistered worker and 
the unregistered wage received by a registered worker are very similar I pro-
pose to use only one single criterion: obtaining a hidden income from labour 
activity. 
Unregistered employment is not reflected in the companies’ reporting, 
but can be revealed by surveys conducted by independent sociological 
organisations. I presume that respondents have fewer incentives to conceal 
this kind of information from non-government institutions than from the 
government agency Goskomstat, and I have more trust in this data. 
Income constraints make people seek an additional job, and the secon-
dary employment is an important feature of the Russian labour market. 
About 30 per cent of the adult population indicate in the surveys that they 
have an additional job.20 Non-governmental institutions such as RCIPO and 
ISITO studied the characteristics of employment and showed that the atti-
tudes of workers with respectively primary and secondary employment are 
different. Whereas only approximately 4-5 per cent of all employed are not 
registered at their principal working places,21 the number of unregistered 
employed among those with secondary employment is prevalent: about 78 
per cent of them (near 25 million people). Nevertheless, a number of the 
interviewed persons may prefer to conceal information from whomsoever. 
Kapeliushnikov (1998) suggested an indirect method of hidden employ-
ment assessment based on the assumption that the participation rate of men 
in the labour force does not change much over time. If the data from the end 
of the 1980s is adjusted according to the new share of retired and students in 
the population, a rough estimation of the hypothetical size of hidden 
employment may be obtained, which comes to 1.5 - 2 million people (about 
2.5 - 3 per cent of the total employment). These estimations embrace only 
those people that are not registered as workers altogether. We see that this 
type of hidden employment does not prevail in Russia. 
However, informal employment may correspond not only to the unregis-
tered work in its entirety but also to the partial evasion of labour tax pay-
ments. In this case we are interested not only in the number of such workers 
but also in the non-reported share of labour income. Russia’s Ministry of 
Taxation22 has conducted estimations of households’ unreported incomes 
based on the results of the companies expenditures and the results of tax in-
spections. They show that about 40 per cent of total household incomes (in-
cluding shadow trades and capital incomes) are untaxed, about 75 per cent of 
unreported incomes are from the informal employment and the hidden pay in 
the formal sector (30 per cent of total incomes), and about 30 million people 
(30 per cent of the adult population) are to some extent involved in informal 
employment.23 
                                                     
19  According to Russia’s labour legislation, military men cannot be employed in civilian 
jobs. 
20  Sindiashkina (1999). 
21  Sinyagin (1998). 
22  Russian Economic Barometer (1998). 
23  Estimations from Kapeliushnikov (1999) are in conformity with these estimates. 
Leonid Andreev 16 
In 1993 Goskomstat of Russia (GKS) started to adjust labour incomes 
statistics from the hidden form of labour compensation.24 If in 1993 hidden 
labour payment constituted 5.3 per cent of GDP, in 1995-97 it was already 
10-15 per cent25. The ratio of the hidden labour payments to the declared 
wage was about 0.2 in 1993, and increased to 0.45-0.46 in 1995-97. So, we 
see again that approximately one-third of labour force compensation is in-
formal. The degree of involvement of the population into the informal sector 
in Russia is as high as in the developing countries. 
We can distinguish between two main types of the shadow compensation: 
 
• Wages paid by means of other types of personal income26 (e.g. ficti-
tious life insurance policies by affiliated insurance companies or pen-
sion funds, loan-deposit schemes in affiliated banks and so on). The 
schemes of this type are quasi-legal and create a tax savings effect 
since tax regimes differ for different types of personal incomes. The 
national statistics provides data on these incomes but treats them as 
non-labour earnings. 
• Payments to labour without any registration27 (i.e. so-called ‘black 
cash’ payments). In this case a firm states the labour costs as material 
outlays, using fictitious contracts and the offshore firms-intermediates. 
The tax saving in this case is very high and significantly exceeds asso-
ciated expenses. The ‘black cash’ funds may replace the legal payroll 
but usually complements it. These funds are also used to bribe officials 
and to get better terms from suppliers. ‘Black cash’ transactions have 
become an essential part of the economic activity of almost all Russian 
firms, regardless of size, industry or type of ownership. 
 
A verbal informal spot labour contract has become the prevailing type of 
employment contracts in Russia, stipulating minimum responsibilities for the 
employer. In contradiction with labour legislation the worker does not get 
severance pay, sick pay and paid leave. A potential worker is aware that the 
wage size is not credible and may be conditioned on the company’s financial 
situation and the size of the labour force, and the worker may be dismissed at 
any time. In the case of bankruptcy the worker cannot claim wage arrears. In 
the chaotic business environment firms try to survive from day to day and do 
not plan their long-run activity. They do not care about their reputations and 
meet their commitments (e.g. pay the wage) only if it is profitable to do so in 
the short run. 
High job-searching and mobility costs along with strict budget constraints 
for households prevent people from being engaged in a time-consuming 
search for an appropriate labour contract and they are likely to accept one of 
the first job offers. As a worker also is not significantly constrained under 
the verbal contract she can quit without delay if something better crops up. 
To prevent quitting an employer can either choose to pay the wage not below 
the reasonable market level or “attach” the worker somehow. Among ways 
                                                     
24  They use the discrepancy regarding households’ expenditures and reported incomes to 
make these assessments. 
25  Russian Economic Barometer (1998). 
26  Gimpelson (1997). 
27  See Ponomarenko and Danishevskaya (1997). 
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of attachment some authors considered such specific features of the Russian 
labour market as gigantic wage arrears28 and the widespread payments in 
kind.29 However, the employer may pay low wages and disregard possible 
quitting if he believes that workers can be almost costlessly replaced. These 
factors can explain the high turnover in the Russian labour market and why 
the informal sector is not considered reliable. 
Determinants of the shadow labour market 
What are the possible reasons for companies and workers to prefer non-reg-
istered labour relationships? If businesses are deep-rooted into the under-
ground economy but employ workers legally, they will reveal their hidden 
activities and sources of generated cash flows, as it is difficult to have legal 
expenses without showing revenues. Thus, labour relationships are usually 
kept informal.  At the same time, employees who do not get a job in the 
advanced sector, have to agree to these conditions if they prefer the commer-
cial sector to the public one. 
Since the size of the unofficial sector in the economy influences the size 
of informal employment, tax evasion considerations affect labour relations 
both directly, via the terms of personal taxation, and indirectly, through the 
scope of unofficial economic activities as a whole.  
Companies “go underground” (i.e. become engaged in unregistered eco-
nomic activities) or/and avoid taxes through financial manipulation, the non-
disclosure of capital or financial incomes, overstatement of tax deductions or 
misstatements of individual circumstances30 since they consider that it is 
relatively advantageous for them comparing with the risk related to such a 
behaviour. The number of factors, both fundamental and organisational, 
determines the level of tax evasion in the country. Fundamental factors deal 
with the intrinsic taxpayer’s readiness to pay and include taxation policy as 
well as government expenditure policy. The organisational factors are repre-
sented by the enforcement mechanism, which makes evasion riskier or more 
costly. Willingness to comply with the existing tax system depends not only 
on the tax burden itself but also on the efficiency of the government expen-
ditures. With the state performing inefficiently, tax evasion may prove to be 
the optimal behavioural option not only for each individual but also for soci-
ety as a whole. 
Comparative investigations of tax evasion determinants show that atti-
tudes toward tax evasion in society are generally not negative. For example, 
a survey by the Centre of Illegal Economic Activity Studies31 captures the 
views of Russians on questions about taxes and the underground economy. 
The investigation was aimed at discovering both the personal participation in 
informal economic activity and attitudes towards informal economic activity 
in general. It revealed a high level of involvement of the population in illegal 
activity and a high tolerance towards such a phenomenon. According to the 
survey, 47 per cent of the respondents are tolerant or at least benevolent to 
                                                     
28  Earle, Saribyanova (1999). 
29  Guriev, Friebel (1999). 
30  Kesselman (1999). 
31  Report by the Centre of Illegal Economic Activity Studies (2000). 
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unregistered wage payment, while they have a more negative attitude 
towards tax evasion practised by managers and businessmen (e.g. 43 per cent 
of the respondents regard ‘with tolerance’ tax evasion by individuals and 
only 22 per cent have the same attitude towards the enterprises’ managers). 
However, the ‘conditional’ question (tax evasion in favour of the firm and 
the workers) showed that 44 per cent approved  of such behaviour. 
The Russian tax system remains in the eyes of taxpayers unjust and un-
predictable, stifling legal economic activities despite relatively low marginal 
tax rates. The inefficient tax-collecting system produces small evasion costs, 
and the marginal rates, acceptable for a taxpayer, are lower in Russia than 
abroad because of high corruption on all levels and a poorly functioning 
state machine (legal system, police etc.). 
The tax burden directly connected with payroll influences the labour 
market most significantly. In this case the declared but broken connection 
between taxes paid and presupposed benefits from taxation makes the payer 
especially reluctant to pay. The social welfare system creates strong disin-
centives for beneficiaries to work in the official economy because of 
extremely weak links between taxes and benefits. The major part of the pay-
roll taxation is represented by the compulsory contribution to the state 
Pension Fund of the Russian Federation (PFRF). The PFRF system operates 
separately from the federal budget and its governance is highly criticised. It 
is accused of mismanagement, resource wasting and non-transparency. 
According to the current pension law, a retiree gets the maximum pension by 
declaring earnings in the size of about 70 per cent of the country’s registered 
average wage within the last five years before retirement, if the length of 
service is at least 25 (20 for women) years. The levelling pension benefit 
formula severely penalises middle- and high- paid workers, thus 
discouraging them from participation. The ageing of the population makes 
present workers expect even lower return on their contributions. The 
efficiency of other social security funds is hardly higher than that of the 
PFRF. Therefore, the incentives to pay contributions are very low among the 
prevalent part of Russian taxpayers. 
The labour market institutions: regulatory framework and trade unions 
In Russia an employment policy is to a certain extent a response to the 
inadequate labour legislation that has been only partially reformed since the 
Soviet era of total employment. The Labour Code imposes on the employer a 
heavy burden of employment costs, considerably increasing total labour 
costs, especially associated with employment of low-paid and the specially 
protected categories of workers, provides for very scarce opportunities to 
hire workers on fixed-term contracts and makes it very hard to dismiss a 
worker even if she is completely unqualified. Therefore, employers try to 
keep employment as flexible as possible.32 Many enterprises prefer to labour 
contracts either civil law contracts, or completely informal labour relation-
ships. For instance, moonlighters are usually hired on verbal informal con-
tracts. 
                                                     
32  See Garibaldi and Brixiova (1997) about labour market institutions in transition countries. 
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Some authors33 point out that the formally very high level of restrictions 
imposed by the Soviet-style labour legislation does not hinder the flexibility 
of Russia’s labour market and does not actually mean over-regulation of the 
market. I suppose nevertheless that such a flexibility is achieved mainly 
through informal institutions and the underground economy adjustment 
mechanism, and actually creates additional distortions of behaviour of the 
market agents. Typically, an employer tries to avoid the following settings of 
the labour law that are particularly costly for him: 
Severance payments. A company must pay the worker three months’ sal-
ary in case of discharge. This clause of a standard labour contract is broken 
very often, especially during mass firings by loss-making enterprises. Obvi-
ously, if this requirement were operational, the high turnover rate in Russia 
would be much lower. I tend to treat the low level of registered labour com-
pensations as, besides other factors, a peculiar form of insurance against 
unforeseen and significant firing expenses in the case of a company restruc-
turing. 
Paid leave. Workers have a right to paid vacation, but employers often do 
not let them to go on leave and do not pay compensation for the lost leave. If 
a worker is employed by a verbal contract, it is especially hard for her to 
claim her right to paid leave. 
Payment when on sick leave. The source of these payments is the gov-
ernmental Social Insurance Fund, which is build on the contributions of 
employers for their registered labour force. Therefore, unregistered workers 
are not entitled to payments from the Fund. 
Unhealthy or dangerous job. If working conditions are recognised to be 
unhealthy or dangerous, the employer must bear a burden of supplementary 
social commitments, for example grant workers additional leave and secure 
sound working conditions. 
There are special regulations concerning some categories of workers, 
namely young workers and women, providing numerous privileges for them 
and therefore making employers especially reluctant to hire them legally. 
The most pronounced are: 
Pregnancy leave and accompanying benefits. The Social Insurance Fund 
and the employer share these expenses, and if the worker is unregistered, she 
is entitled only to the minimum benefit from the Fund. By law, the employer 
should pay direct allowance, which amounts to a 140-day wage. Certainly, 
the unregistered part cannot be counted for the calculation and thus 
decreases the allowance paid to the worker. 
Academic leave. Everybody has a right to a part-time study at a college or 
university while working and to go on paid leave during examinations (40-
50 calendar days per year). In practice employers are reluctant to grant such 
a leave, and at best provide it without pay. 
While a legal framework for labour relationships exists in nowadays Rus-
sia and is quite favourable for employees, the importance of the legislation is 
undermined by the weak enforcement mechanism. There are no specialised 
courts examining labour conflicts, and the existing courts do not do this job 
well. Workers neither are used to take legal advantage of the legislation in 
labour conflicts nor do they exploit this possibility due to the informal kind 
                                                     
33  See Layard and Richter (1994), Commander and Tolstopiatenko (1997). 
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of labour relations. Moreover, they do not have an active support from the 
unions. 
The Soviet trade unions behaved as the specialised branch of the Com-
munist Party responsible for labour relationships, workers recreation etc. 
Membership was compulsory and the unionisation rate approached 100 per 
cent. After the revolution of 1991 trade unions lost a significant part of their 
influence. The unionisation rate in the Russian economy is gradually 
declining. Despite the fact that the reformed old trade unions (renamed the 
Federation of Independent Trade Unions, FNPR) still claim around 60 mil-
lion members, active membership is much smaller. 
The FNPR keeps up into presence in a majority of state-owned and pri-
vatised enterprises, but the managers of the newly emerged firms managed 
to prevent a substantial unionisation of their workers. Traditionally, the old-
fashioned union leaders considered themselves to be part of the administra-
tion. The Labour Code requires that workers be dismissed only with the con-
sent of the labour union, and unions have extensive rights to arrange strikes, 
formally giving them an extremely strong bargaining position. Therefore the 
company managers try to tame the present union leaders so that the unions 
do not exercise their bargaining power and they oppose penetration by new 
aggressive unions. A right to go on strike has made the new “wild” trade 
unions a handy tool in corporate conflicts. There are numerous cases when 
the unions were also used for blackmailing competitors or to overthrow the 
management by a rivalling group of shareholders.34 Nevertheless, trade 
unions in Russia very rarely try to utilise their influence to promote employ-
ees’ interests. Enterprises that have been emerging since the beginning of the 
reforms are almost non-unionised and unions virtually do not exist in the 
“old economy”. Therefore, unlike other countries, the impact of trade unions 
on wages in Russia is negligible. 
The state of economic development and therefore the demand for labour 
differ by regions but migration of the labour force within the country is 
impeded by relatively high migration costs in comparison with potential 
gains, especially for low-skilled workers. The country’s magnitude makes 
the transportation costs a significant factor and conservation of the Soviet 
registration system increases settlers’ costs due to bribes. All this makes the 
regional labour markets practically closed. “This implies that the alternative 
wage faced by a worker in a firm will be the wage in alternative employment 
in a similar firm in the same region of Russia.” 35 
The legal requirement to pay a minimum monthly wage is not a pro-
nounced determinant of hidden employment in Russia unlike the countries of 
Eastern and Central Europe.36 The wage that the employer is obliged to pay 
the full-time worker does not exceed 5 USD (i.e. it is slightly above 12 per 
cent of the registered average wage and approximately 15 per cent of the 
subsistence level). Therefore, unregistered wages below the minimum 
threshold simply do not exist. 
As a result of the hidden nature of labour relationships, information about 
jobs is often not available for job seekers; so a worker does not know exactly 
                                                     
34  Lehmann, Wadswortth and Acquisti (1998). 
35  Luke and Schaffer (2000). 
36  See Barr (1994). 
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how much she will receive beyond the official pay, if any. A combination of 
hidden labour compensation and wage arrears creates multiple hardships for 
outside observers, like other employers, job seekers, government agencies, 
researchers and investors. Thus, information about the quality of working 
places becomes a private good for insiders. Sociological surveys show that 
the level of compensation varies considerably across companies of the same 
industry due to the financial opportunities of a certain company. This infor-
mation, remained private, does not influence the level of compensation in 
other companies. 
The size of the underground economy is conditioned by the balance of 
the benefits versus the costs of moving into that sector. The benefits include 
taxes evaded, while costs include uncertainty in labour relationships, 
expenses of concealment and potential penalties, as well as moral costs. 
Western literature tends to treat underground labour market participants as 
less averse to risk, relative to their counterparts above ground, less fair, more 
efficient at concealment, and/or employed in those occupations or industries 
that are most amenable to tax evasion.37 I do not believe that is the case for 
Russia. First of all, since an employer is responsible for the payment of taxes 
and observance of labour legislation, he usually makes the decision con-
cerning a form of employment or the degree of tax compliance. This deci-
sion is closely connected with the type of business, the whole tax evasion 
strategy and does not depend on the preferences of the workers. The pres-
ence or a type of labour contract, a share of the displayed labour compensa-
tion etc. do not normally become a subject of negotiations between employ-
ers and workers.  
Second, we do not have particular reasons to believe that the higher 
degree of individual risk aversion would make workers avoid hidden labour 
relationships. When hidden employment is the overwhelming phenomenon, 
it is safer for a single worker to participate in this system as well. 
Therefore I believe that the heterogeneity of the labour force does not 
help us in explaining the phenomenon of Russia’s hidden employment and 
hence I use a model where all the workers are equally skilled and risk-neu-
tral, but nevertheless receive different wages and work in different sectors. 
                                                     
37  See Alexeev (1999) for the consideration on the model with different levels of risk-
aversion and skills of concealment as the explanation of shadow employment. 

A model of the labour market 
The primary purpose of our analysis is to model three principal sectors of the 
labour market, namely the public sector and two commercial sectors: 
advanced and shadow, and to study changes in labour incomes and employ-
ment there. The choice of the three-sector model in the Harris-Todaro tradi-
tion38 is justified by the features of the Russian labour market, particularly in 
the large industrial cities, discussed above. I do not include agriculture 
because it is a rather insignificant sector (about 5 per cent of the country’s 
GDP) with low productivity and heavy subsidies from the government.   
It is convenient to use a three-sectoral static model with labour rigidity in 
one of them to analyse the mutual influences of labour incomes and 
employments and to consider the consequences of different government 
policies on the labour market characteristics. The aim of the government is 
to increase employment and production in the advanced sector by means of 
the following policies: 
 
• Wages paid by means of other types of personal income39 (e.g. ficti-
tious life insurance policies by affiliated insurance companies or pen-
sion funds, loan-deposit schemes in affiliated banks and so on). The 
schemes of this type are quasi-legal and create a tax savings effect 
since tax regimes differ for different types of personal incomes. The 
national statistics provides data on these incomes but treats them as 
non-labour earnings. 
• adjusting the tax rate; 
• promoting investments in modern technologies by subsidising or tax 
shields; 
• intensifying inspections of firms; 
• changing pension parameters. 
The model’s set-up and assumptions 
The total labour force is distributed between these three sectors: honest, or 
advanced (H), shadow, or hidden (S), and public (P): 
 
PSPSH LkLLLLL )1( ++=++=                                           (1) 
where k is a ratio of H-sector employment to P-sector employment.  
 
The H-sector consists of foreign companies and respectable Russian 
companies that comply with legislation (i.e. labour, taxation etc.) and seldom 
use any semi-legal schemes of tax planning or shadow employment, even if 
such behaviour may be profitable and almost unpunished in the short run. H-
                                                     
38  See Harris and Todaro (1970), Moene (1988). 
39  Gimpelson (1997). 
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sector firms’ compliance may be explained by their technological peculiari-
ties. Their technologies provide them with high labour productivity and low 
costs, and the economy of scale requires that the company be large and well 
established, so that discontinuance in production is extremely costly. But due 
to their size these companies are highly exposed to the risks of the tax and 
labour authorities’ inspections. Hence, the first sector companies cannot 
escape registration of the workers and have to sign labour contracts with 
them. Higher efficiency gives them the possibility to bear labour costs 
related to the legal labour contract.  
At the same time, numerous shadow sector companies constitute the main 
part of Russian economy. They produce the same goods or services as the H-
sector, but they almost do not use capital and their productivity is low. The 
level of production depends on the size of the present labour force (with con-
stant return to scale). It resembles self-employment, and for such companies 
the difference between employees, managers and owners is insufficient. In 
this sector labour contracts are informal and fulfilment of wage promises 
depends on the surviving of the firms.  
For the sake of simplicity we assume that firms here do not pay any 
taxes. As no taxes are paid this sector behaves neither as recipient nor as 
beneficiary of redistribution within the economy, and thus is virtually self-
subsistent. The firms do not bear any costs related to tax evasion and may be 
easily detected. In case of detection a big fine is imposed, that the firm own-
ers prefer to proclaim bankruptcy and close down the company. A worker 
knows that under such circumstances wage promises would not be fulfilled. 
Nevertheless, the probability of such an outcome is sensibly small due to the 
large number of firms and the low frequency of inspections. 
 
The H-sector employment is determined by profit maximisation and total 
demand for labour is a function of the wage, the technological factor E and 
the tax rate t: 
 
),,( EtwgL HH = ;       ,0,0,0 321 <<< ggg                        (2)  
 
The demand for labour is a decreasing function of payroll tax, wage and 
technology. We assume that better technologies make production less 
labour-intensive and thus reduce the demand for labour. 
H-sector firms are interested in motivating their workers to work dili-
gently and hence pay them higher wages than in the rest of the economy. As 
in the standard Harris-Todaro model wages in one of the sectors are higher 
than in the rest of the economy, but here I use the efficiency wage approach 
to explain this. H-sector firms set the wages higher than the workers’ outside 
option to counterbalance the disutility from the concentrated and demanding 
job and to create incentives for a worker.  
The average product of labour is highest in this sector of the economy 
and the firms there are especially interested in motivating their workers to 
work hard since:  
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• Higher diligence of employees and higher intensity of labour are 
required by the H-sector technology; 
• An H-sector company does not employ people from the non-commer-
cial sector. At the same time hiring workers from the S-sector is asso-
ciated with full uncertainty about their diligence and ability to work 
hard, and so creates “recognition costs” for the company. Therefore, 
the company tends to avoid costly turnover and tries to keep its present 
workers. 
 
The H-sector firms should pay a certain wage premium with respect to the 
public sector wage. This employment premium is increasing in the techno-
logical parameter E since better technology demands higher effort and is 
decreasing in k since a higher fraction of workers in the H-sector “washes 
away” the particularity of the sector: 
 
1 2( 0 0H Pw w R k E R R= + , ) < >  ,                                         (3) 
Nevertheless, the premium is inelastic with respect to k as H-sector firms do 
not adjust wages much with changing structure of employment: 
 
( )1;0∈∂
∂≡
k
R
R
kϑ  
where ϑ  is defined as the elasticity of the employment premium w.r.t. ratio 
k. 
All the companies are levied only payroll tax (the compulsory payment 
linearly related to the company’s wage payments), but only firms from the 
H-sector pay taxes.  
The shadow sector can be represented by small trade, services and manu-
facturing firms, and most of them are basically individual entrepreneurs. 
Labour is the sole production factor in this sector. Everybody can be 
employed in this sector as it is close to self-employment, but income per 
worker decreases with the growth of the sector. The sector’s wage depends 
only on the employment there: 
 
)( SS Lfw =           0'<f                                                          (4) 
The third sector (public) includes all the public companies or governmental 
institutions.  
Regional governments collect taxes from the H-sector and use them to 
pay wages to the workers in the public sector. The size of the wage of the P-
sector’s workers is determined by the transformed budget constraint of the 
government:  
ktw
L
tLww H
P
HH
p == ,                                                                     (5) 
Remuneration in the H-sector is always higher than the one in the public 
sector, whereas the wages in the S-sector are higher or lower than the wages 
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in the H- and P-sectors, depending on the probability of receiving the wage 
or the probability of finding a job in the H-sector.  
It can also be written as follows: 
 
twLwL HHPP =  
It means that the total payroll of the public is the share of the H-sector’s pay-
roll, and the total labour costs of the H-sector are )1( +twL HH .  
In addition to wages, workers in every sector are entitled to rights to 
benefits should they be disabled or unfit to work because of age. The gov-
ernment pays, but payment is conditional on previous contributions to the 
social security. We assume that the local government does not pay any pen-
sion benefits either directly or by means of contributions to the federal pen-
sion fund, and thus all the benefits are paid from this external source. For the 
sake of simplicity we neglect all the pension benefits (i.e. sickness benefit or 
disability pension) but the retirement one and assume that there are only two 
possibilities: to get either maximum or minimum benefit.  
Making her employment decision the worker considers both her current 
and her future income. Firms in the H-sector pay all the pension contribu-
tions for their workers and H-workers get the maximum pension. Firms in 
the S-sectors do not pay contributions at all and their workers are entitled to 
the minimum pension. Although public employees pay payroll taxes, assume 
for now that the level of their wages will not allow them to get pensions 
above the minimum level. Summarising, workers in the S- and P- sectors can 
count upon the minimum state pension S, and H-workers get the maximum 
pension Sr, where r is the differentiation rate, determined by the govern-
ment. Higher benefit from social security is a distinctive advantage of legal 
employment.  
The value of employment (total income) of the H-company’s worker is: 
 
SrwV HH +=                                                                          (6) 
Quite obviously, r is greater than one: 1>r . 
There is some turnover between two commercial sectors. The H-sector 
may expand or contract, some workers leave the labour force etc., and the 
sector randomly recruits workers from the shadow commercial sector. The 
possibility to obtain a job in the H-sector is valuable for the workers from 
other sectors, but H-sector firms recruit only from the other commercial 
sector. P-sector workers are ruled out because H-sector employers use jobs 
in the public sector as a biased screening devise, that is, workers of the P-
sector are (unfairly) assumed to be unable to work in the commercial sector. 
Therefore, they should first migrate to the S-sector in order to have a chance 
to seek H-sector jobs. 
The S-sector worker may get a job in the H-sector with the probability h 
that depends on the current number of jobs in the H-sector. All the workers 
in the S-sector are considered identical and hired randomly by the H-sector 
in case of need. Hence, the probability h is equal to the share of the sector in 
the economy. For simplicity the total labour force is normalised to 1. 
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The shadow sector worker is uncertain about the promised wage due to 
the risks related to the fact that the whole business activity is hidden. With 
the probability (1-ξ) an S-firm can be caught by the tax authorities or the 
labour inspection and be closed down. In this case a worker cannot claim 
wage debts due to the absence of a formal labour contract. Hence ξ is a sub-
jective probability of obtaining the promised wage wS in the S-sector.  
We assume risk neutrality for the shadow economy’s worker, and hence 
the value of S-sector employment is just the sum of expected wage, the 
minimum pension and a value of the possibility to become an H-sector 
employee: 
 [ ]SSrwwhSwV SHSS −+−++= ξξ                                          (7)  
The expected value of the public sector worker includes wage and the 
minimum pension benefit S: 
 
SwV PP +=                                                                              (8) 
Workers in the H-sector get both higher wages and pensions than P-sector 
worker. 
Jobs in the H-sector are scarce but the flow between the remaining two 
sectors is free. Workers migrate until incomes are equalised in equilibrium, 
which makes the workers indifferent between the sectors: 
 
SP VV =                                                                                               (9) 
We have enough equations to determine endogenous variables: wages, 
expected incomes and employment in three sectors. 
To characterise inequality of the labour incomes between the sectors I 
introduce an income differential between H- and S- and P-sectors: 
 
PHSH VVVVD −=−=                                                             (10) 
By means of equations (3) and (5) I derive the expression for wages in 
public and honest sectors as the functions of k, t and E: 
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,,,               (11) 
And for the income differential D: 
 ( ) )1(, −+=−+−= rSEkRSSrwwD PH  
Using equations (1), (2), (4) and (7) I get wage and expected value of 
employment in the S-sector also as the functions of k, t and E: 
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To preserve the privileged position of the H-sector with wages greater than 
in the P-sector kt should be smaller than 1. This means that for t=0,5 the 
employment ratio k varies in the interval ( )2,0 , i.e. employment in the H-
sector cannot be two times greater than P-sector employment. Since in 
today’s Russia k is considerably less than 2, this value may be set as a target 
for the government policy. For lower tax rates the upper bound of the inter-
val increases.  
We remember that the employment ratio changes with the changes in 
employment in two sectors and stays unaffected if employments there 
change proportionally. To the contrary, any deterioration of the advanced 
sector conditions simultaneously leads to contraction of the public sector 
employment. Hence, k will change in the same direction as the H-sector 
employment itself, but with greater magnitude. 
Effects on employment 
The goal of this section is to consider how different government policies 
affect the employment ratio k in the economy.  
Conditions for the labour market (1) and for employment in the H-sector 
(2) yield us the employment in the shadow sector as a function of k, t and E: 
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Then, the migration equilibrium of the equality of expected incomes in the 
S- and P-sectors (Vp = Vs) allows us to derive the expected income in the S-
sector 
 ( ) ( )SSrhShwhwSSrwwhSwV SHSHSS −++−+=−+−++= )1(ξξξ  
(15) 
and together with conditions (1), (3) and (5) we can state the function 
),,,,,,( LErStkQ ξ , which relates to the employment ratio k and the model 
parameters. 
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Analysis of this function provides us with the opportunity to assess how the 
model parameters t, S, r, E, ξ and L influence the employment ratio k and, 
consequently, analyse how migration processes may be affected by the 
change in the model parameters. This function is constant in equilibrium and 
k is an implicit function of the parameters. Therefore the implicit function 
theorem is applicable.  
So, we have: 
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Therefore, to determine the direction of change of different parameters on 
k we need to know the influence of the parameters on the function Q. 
 
Lemma 1. The partial effect of the employment ratio k on the function Q is 
positive. Proof: 
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We have also: 
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The sign of the expression depends on hkt − . Substituting for k and L 
and normalising L=1 as before, we need to compare t and LP. Since the 
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empirical data stipulates that t is about 0.5, LP is between 0.2 and 0.5, we 
have t>LP and can take the sign of the first item to be proved positive. 
We are left with the last term: 
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( ) 0ˆ' >−∂∂= HSHw VVkwg H  since 0ˆ <− HS VV  
where SVˆ  is the “real” part of the shadow employment value such that 
)(ˆ SHSS wwhVV −+= . 
 
Summing up, we obtain 0>∂
∂
k
Q
 
Q.E.D. 
Hence, the sign of the derivatives of Q with respect to the parameters is 
just the opposite to the sign of the derivatives of k with respect to them. 
Effects of the tax policy 
Proposition 1.  
 
1. The employment share of the H-sector responds negatively on the 
increased tax rate; 
2. The employment share of the H-sector with respect to tax rate is greater 
than the unity in absolute value. 
Proof: see Appendix. 
 
The first result can be justified because the higher tax impedes the develop-
ment of the sector and simultaneously makes the other sectors more attrac-
tive. Hence, the model predicts that today’s government’s efforts to reduce 
personal taxes should bring expansion of the H-sector and lower level of 
employment in the S-sector. 
The second result says that the employment ratio is quite sensitive to the 
changes of the tax rate. Nevertheless, I believe that the employment ratio 
cannot change too sharply with the tax rate and hence cannot be too big in 
magnitude.  
What can we say about employment in the shadow sector? We would 
expect that the higher tax rate makes the sector larger and decreases wages 
there. To check that we take the partial derivative with respect to t and see 
that it is positive: 
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The general effect is a combination of direct and indirect effects: 
 
dt
dk
k
L
t
L
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dL SSS
∂
∂+∂
∂=   
Since 
dt
dk
is proved to be negative, the sign of the whole expression 
depends upon how the employment ratio in the two sectors affects employ-
ment in the third one. Obviously, the sign depends on the main source of the 
change in k. If k primarily reflects changes in the H-sector, the effect for the 
shadow employment is negative, and the shadow sector grows when taxes 
are raised. Growth in k due to the shrinkage of the public sector increases the 
shadow sector and the whole effect of taxes on the sector depends on the 
relative magnitude of two effects: direct and indirect. 
Nevertheless the partial derivative of LS with respect to k provides us with 
an unambiguously counterintuitive result:  
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The positive signs of 
k
wH
∂
∂
and ( ) RtktR +−1'  are proved in lemma 
2 (see Appendix), 
Hw
g ' is negative by assumption, and therefore LS always 
grows with k, even if LP grows. This result may be interpreted as follows: an 
expansion of the H-sector is accompanied by contraction of the two remain-
ing sectors, but this contraction is entirely accounted for by the public sector 
diminution, whereas the shadow sector grows along with the H-sector. 
The ambiguity of the result must make us careful in discussing the taxa-
tion effect for the shadow sector. Besides the direct effect of taxes on the 
sector we should consider how taxes affect the sector via their impact on the 
rest of the economy. 
Effects of the technological level 
We saw that a better technology changes the employment in the same direc-
tion as a higher tax rate does. The same we can say about the effects on the 
wages.  
We expect that k decreases with E, and indeed: 
 
Proposition 2.  
1)  Better technological conditions in the H-sector reduce the employment 
share of this sector. 
2)  The employment share of the H-sector with respect to the technological 
parameter is greater than the unity in absolute value. 
 
Proof: see Appendix. 
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Despite the similar effects the rationale is quite different: the tax policy 
stunts development of the advanced sector and so reduces employment there. 
Better technology replaces workers and so reduces employment. 
The second result is also quite interesting: the employment rate is quite 
sensitive to small changes in technology and the level of taxation. Never-
theless, the very high sensitivity is unreasonable to adopt for our analysis, 
otherwise it would be too easy for the social planner to reach the desirable 
level of k by very small changes in parameters. 
The partial derivative of the shadow sector employment grows with 
higher E: 
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but the total effect is ambiguous: 
dE
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E
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∂
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k
LS
∂
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is positive and 
dE
dk
 is negative  
The transmission mechanism is as follows: better technology reduces the 
demand for labour and hence employment in the advanced sector, whereas 
the remaining workers receive higher wage than before (will be shown later). 
Consequently, the value of the possibility to be employed by the H-sector for 
shadow workers becomes greater, but the chance to get this possibility 
becomes smaller. Therefore, the total reallocation of the labour force 
between the public and shadow sectors due to technological changes 
depends on the relative strength of these opposite effects. 
Effects of the punitive policy 
This type of policy means that the government attempts to affect the prob-
ability of receiving the wage ξ in the S-sector, using different administrative 
instruments: intensification of tax inspections, frequent raids of the tax 
police, thorough control of pay-sheets etc. 
Derivation of Q with respect to ξ yields us the following result: 
 
ξξ ∂
∂−= Qsign
d
dksign ,  where  0)1( <−−=∂
∂
Swh
Q
ξ . 
It means that the higher probability ξ increases the employment ratio k, 
consequently reduces employment in the public sector. Hence, a higher fre-
quency of inspections will squeeze workers out of the S-sector to the public 
sector without effects for the H-sector. Due to the equations (5) and (9) 
labour income becomes smaller in the S- and P-sectors. 
Effects of the pension policy 
We know that higher pensions increase expected incomes in all sectors. It is 
obvious since the source of pensions is outside the model and they may be 
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considered a gift. Now we will show that higher pension parameters also 
increase the employment ratio k. 
Differentiation of Q w.r.t. the minimum pension S yields 
 
S
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and correspondingly w.r.t. differentiation coefficient r: 
r
Qsign
dr
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∂ hS
r
Q
 
Therefore, with higher pension parameters employment in the H-sector 
grows. Intuition of this result is the following: higher benefits from legal 
employment reduce incentives to work in the hidden sector.  
Effects of changes in the size of the total labour force 
Assume that the government’s demographic policy can affect the size of the 
labour force. We are interested in knowing how a change in the population 
size affects its allocation between the sectors of the labour market. The 
model allows us to check effects of the changes in L for the employment 
ratio k. The derivative of Q w.r.t. L is positive, and hence k declines with a 
greater labour force. 
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This result is quite sensitive: the H-sector does not meet higher supply on the 
labour market, and additional workers go to the two backward sectors. But 
since today’s Russia experiences a decline in population, we can expect a 
tighter market and a higher fraction of the H-sector in the economy. 
Effects on wages and expected incomes 
In this section I intend to assess how different governmental policies affect 
labour incomes in the three sectors, and examine how wages in all sectors 
vary with the employment ratio k and the wage premium R. 
 
Lemma 2. 1) The partial derivative of wage in the P-sector with respect to 
the employment ratio k is always positive. The partial derivative of wage in 
the H-sector is positive for actual values of t=0.5, ( )2;0∈k  and ( )1;0∈ϑ . 
Wage in the H-sector grows with k if 
kt
kt
−1  is greater than the elasticity of 
the employment premium w.r.t. the ratio k. 
2) The partial derivative of wage in the S-sector is negative with 
respect to the employment ratio k. The employment value in the sector goes 
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down with k as well, if the elasticity of the H-sector employment w.r.t. the 
wage ς  is not less than 
H
S
w L
wg
H
ˆ
'1+ , where 
H
H
H
H
L
w
w
L
∂
∂≡ς . 
Proof: see Appendix. 
 
Since 
k
w
k
w HP
∂
∂>∂
∂ , a tighter H-sector labour market (higher value of 
k) increases the wage of public employees faster than the wage in the H-
sector because the employment premium in this sector goes up as k declines. 
The wage differential between the two sectors decreases with k, but cannot 
disappear on the given interval.  
Thus, the value of employment in the S-sector is decreasing with k. But 
since there are several opposite effects on incomes in the S-sector from a 
changing employment structure, we can have a negative sign of the deriva-
tive even with a much lower elasticity if the negative term 
k
wh S∂
∂− )1(ξ  is 
large enough, i.e. if the product of probabilities )1( h−ξ is close to 1 and the 
magnitude of the wage change with k is high.  
The wage of a shadow worker is decreasing with the increasing 
employment premium of the H-sector, but the total employment value can 
change in either direction depending on the values of the parameters.  
Hence higher employment rent makes the value of employment in the S-
sector larger if k is sufficiently high and )( SLf  and )(Rg  are steep enough, 
and is reduced when the wage in the S-sector falls fast with higher 
employment there. The transmission mechanism works as follows: better 
conditions in the H-sector make the S-sector more attractive and equilibrium 
employment in the shadow sector increases at the expense of the public sec-
tor. Higher employment reduces the wage and the total result depends on the 
extent of this decrease. 
Effects of the tax policy 
Change in the tax rate is one of the most handy and powerful instruments of 
government regulation. The Russian tax reform proposes reduction in the 
personal tax rate, and this simple model allows us to assess the consequences 
for labour incomes. To assess taxation influence on wages in the different 
sectors I need to set up several interim results. 
 
Lemma 3. Partial derivatives of wages in the public and H-sectors with 
respect to the tax rate are positive and equal. The partial derivative of the S-
sector wage with respect to the tax rate is negative, but the sign of the 
derivative of the employment value in the S-sector is ambiguous.  
Proof: 
1. Differentiation of the wage functions with respect to t yields 
0
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We see that wages in the H- and P-sectors grow in t with the same 
magnitude.  
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The last term is the only positive one. The sign of the whole expression 
depends on the relative magnitude of the negative and positive terms. 
Q.E.D. 
That fact that wages in the P- and H-sectors grow simultaneously with t is 
not very intuitive but remember that the wage in the H-sector consists of two 
parts, and while a higher tax rate increases the benchmark wage (P-sector 
wage), it decreases employment in the H-sector and thus makes the premium 
grow.  
Now we are in a position to assess the general influence of the rate of 
taxation on the wages. We see that the general effect consists of two effects: 
direct (represented by the partial derivative) and indirect effect via the effect 
on k. The direct effect is obviously positive for the wages in the P- and H-
sectors and negative for the S-sector. The indirect effect in all cases has the 
opposite sign, and the general effect is ambiguous. To discuss the conditions 
under which the indirect effect may be stronger than the direct one we need 
to compare the relative magnitude of the two effects. Let us establish several 
results, conditioned upon the assumptions about the values of the variables: 
 
a)  The wages in the H- and P-sectors go up with the tax rate if the changes 
in the tax rate do not cause significant changes in the employment ratio.  
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ϑ  is the elasticity of the wage premium with respect to k, defined 
earlier. For our real data 
k
t
is lower than 1, and 
( )
2
1
k
kt−ϑ
 is negative. Hence 
the whole sum in parenthesis is lower than one (but positive), such that the 
higher elasticity ϑ  makes it lower. Being multiplied by A (greater than one), 
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the expression also may turn out to be greater than one. Therefore, the sign 
of the whole expression depends on the magnitude of A and the elasticity ϑ . 
The greater the elasticity, the greater A should be to make the whole expres-
sion negative.  
We see that ( )
( )
( )22 1
1'
1 kt
tRktR
kt
Rk
−
+−>−  and A plays a role of amplifying 
coefficient.  
 
Analogously, for the public sector wage: 
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We see that the sum in parenthesis ( ) 11 +− ktϑ is lower than one and is 
multiplied by A (greater than one) and 
k
t
 (generally smaller than 1). Hence, 
the total effect is unknown in general, but for a plausibly small A it will be 
positive as well.  
Although for most of values of A the wages in two sectors will change 
identically, there is some interval of A for which the H-sector wage will 
increase and the public sector wage will decrease.  
It means that in spite of the direct effects on both wages being positive, 
they are different in magnitude: the wage in the H-sector increases with the 
taxes more than one in the public sector. Correspondingly, the wage differ-
ential grows with tax rate:  
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  since both partial derivatives 
are negative. 
 
This result is quite important and is valid for the shadow sector wage as 
well: higher taxes make the advanced sector smaller but its well-paid work-
ers are better off, and hence income inequality in the economy increases. We 
can conclude that the policy of reduction in personal taxation, conducted by 
the Russian government, will lead to more egalitarian income distribution. 
 
b)  S-sector wages go down under the reasonable assumptions regarding the 
A magnitude. 
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We can see that the sign of ( )
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tive if A and tg ' are not too big in magnitude. If they are not, the wage in the 
shadow sector decreases with the tax rate. 
This result was expected: the wage in the shadow sector is a declining 
function of the employment there, and since shadow employment increases 
with taxes, the wage should go down. But since the whole effect for shadow 
sector employment is ambiguous, the effect for the shadow sector wage is 
ambiguous as well.  
We see that direct (represented by the partial derivative) and indirect 
(product of the partial derivatives of wage with respect to the wage differen-
tial and the partial derivatives of the wage differential with respect to the tax 
rate) effects on wages work against each other in all cases. It is the case 
because of interlinks between the sectors in the economy. A higher tax rate 
makes the wage of the S-worker go down and those of the H-worker go up, 
and therefore increases the wage differential between the sectors. At the 
same time a higher wage in the H-sector leads to contraction of the sector 
and the chance to get a job there also diminishes. Therefore, the value of a 
chance to enter the H-sector for an S-worker is influenced positively by a 
higher wage there and negatively by a lower probability to be captured by H-
firms. Although we do not know the mutual effect, we can see that a lot 
depends on the size of the H-sector and the sensitivity of the sector’s wage 
on the tax rate’s change. If this effect is not so prominent compared with the 
direct wage effect, the value of S-sector employment will decline with a 
higher tax rate. 
Effects of the policy influencing the level of technology 
The government cannot affect the technological parameter E equally easily 
as to change the tax rate, but we assume that E may be influenced in differ-
ent ways. It is a complex indicator reflecting effects on the level of invest-
ment in technologies and managerial skills, and depends not only on the 
government’s actions. Nevertheless, we can interpret some government deci-
sions as the direct change in E and see what consequences for labour 
incomes it may bring. To determine the direct impact of the technology on 
wages in the different sectors I set up the following lemma: 
 
Lemma 4. Better technological conditions have a positive direct effect on 
labour incomes in the H- and P-sectors, and a negative effect on wages in the 
S-sector. The effect for the partial derivative of the employment value in the 
S-sector is ambiguous, but the partial derivative of the income differential 
with respect to E is unambiguously positive: 
Proof: 
1.  Technological progress E in the H-sector is beneficial for the H- and P-
sectors: 
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We see that both wages increase with better technology in the H-sector, 
and the wage differential D goes up:  
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2.  For the S-sector: 
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In this case the positive effect on wages for the shadow employment 
value as well as for the public workers is just the spillover effect of higher 
productivity in the advanced sector, since the public workers get only a small 
fraction of the H-sector success. 
Q.E.D. 
To identify the sign of 
E
VS
∂
∂
we have to know the relative magnitudes of 
the first negative term and the second positive one. The negative term 
expresses the effect of E on the wage part of the employment value and the 
second reflects the influence on the part of expected incomes of the S-
worker related with possible employment in the H-sector. For the whole 
expression to be positive the second effect must be stronger than the effect 
on the real part of incomes SVˆ . It may happen if E considerably increases the 
H-sector wage and the probability to get an H-sector job for an S-worker is 
sufficiently high such that a lower S-wage will be overcompensated by the 
increased value of the chance to improve her employment position. 
The direct effect of better technologies is quite obvious: the H-sector 
requires fewer workers, but pays them more. The wage of public workers is 
exposed to two effects: higher tax revenues are distributed among a larger 
number of recipients, but the total direct effect is positive as well.  
Again, the general effect of technologies on the wages is made up of two 
effects: 
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The sign of the expression depends on the relative values of two items in 
the nominator.  
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Hence, the sign of the expression depends on the sign of kE BRR '' − . If 
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is not great in magnitude, this difference is positive and the whole 
expression is positive as well.  
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If the value of g’E is not too big, the sign of the expression is negative, i.e. 
shadow sector wages go down with better technologies in the economy. 
The general effect of technology on H-sector employment is negative as 
both the direct effect and the indirect effect via wage
E
wg HwH ∂
∂'  are nega-
tive. Indeed, with better technological conditions and higher productivity H-
firms require fewer workers, pay them more and thus can afford to hire even 
fewer workers. Thus, we see that the wage in the S-sector is decreasing with 
the technological parameter E due to the effect through LS. While wages in 
the two legal sectors increase with better technologies, the shadow wage 
declines. 
Despite the fact that wages increase in both law-abiding sectors, we can 
see that the income differential becomes wider with better technologies: 
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The first item is positive and the second is the product of two negative 
factors. Better technologies in the advanced sector widen the gap of well-
being between the sectors. 
Hence, under certain conditions better technology increases labour 
incomes in the H- and P-sectors, and decreases wages in the S-sector. The 
effect on the employment value in the S-sector is ambiguous, but the income 
differential between the H- and S-sectors unambiguously grows with E. 
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Effects of the pension policy 
In our model the size of the pension does not depend on the wages, and the 
government can change only the pension boundary values. In its pension 
policy the Russian government constantly balances between a necessity to 
provide subsistence conditions to the poorest pensioners and to keep incen-
tives for high-paid workers to pay contributions. In the difficult financial 
situation of the 1990s the difference between the maximum and the mini-
mum pension constantly shrank, and that lowered incentives to pay contri-
butions and further deteriorated the situation. 
The minimum pension S and the ratio of pension differentiation r are 
instruments of the government policy here.  
Proposition 5. 1) A higher minimum pension increases labour incomes in 
every single sector, such that incomes in the H-sector grow most and in the 
public sector least. 2) A higher pension differentiation ratio increases labour 
incomes in the H- and S-sectors, and the incomes in the H-sector grow most. 
Proof: 
The effects of the pension parameters on the value employment are obvi-
ously positive: 
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Comparing them with the pension parameters’ influence on the employ-
ment values in the H- and P-sectors, we obtain: 
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since r is greater than 1 (otherwise the minimum pension is equal 
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Q.E.D. 
It is very intuitive that growth in the pension parameters improves the 
conditions of workers in all sectors (except the differentiation ratio r that 
does not affect public workers) but H-sector workers win most. Both income 
differentials increase; however, the differential between the H- and the S-
sector grows less than between the H- and the P-sector. 
In our model inequality grows with the pension parameters. Nevertheless, 
this result rests on the extreme simplification of the pension formula. 
 
Suggested policies and their implica-
tions 
The government’s aspirations 
I have derived the influences of different parameters on wages and employ-
ment in the economy. On this basis the policymaker may design a policy 
tailored to the particular politically or socially motivated needs. 
It has been shown that an increase in the H-sector is accompanied by an 
increase in the S-sector, and therefore this model does not allow us to pursue 
simultaneously two tasks: to reduce the shadow sector and to promote devel-
opment of the advanced sector. We also know that a higher employment 
ratio brings about unclear consequences for the employment in the public 
sector: it may grow or contract depending on different values of the 
parameters. Therefore, there is a trade-off for the government: either it pre-
fers to support the advanced sector and becomes reconciled to the enlarged 
S-sector, or it imposes strict measures against the S-sector, which cause 
greater public sector employment and lower incomes there. 
I assume that the government’s objective function includes the volume of 
the governmental services provided and the probability to be re-elected, and 
therefore the government is interested in a large public sector. In terms of 
our model, it means large public sector expenditures (i.e. payroll), since we 
assume that the number of public employees and their quality expressed in 
salaries to a certain extent are substitutes.  
Nevertheless, the government’s utility depends on the value of the payroll 
only for a certain range of employment and wages values. If the latter is too 
low and the former too large, the utility from the public sector becomes 
negative, since poor public employees and a higher level of corruption are 
not favourable factors for re-election.  
Low salaries in the public sector in today’s Russia lead to severe corrup-
tion in various spheres, i.e. supervision and licensing bodies, the police, 
institutions of public health and education, and at the same time to a declin-
ing quality of the public services. Although the public sector in Russia has 
not reached the size of the public sectors in the advanced Western econo-
mies, it has considerably increased in size since the collapse of the Soviet 
economy. The Soviet state controlled everything in social and economic life, 
and given that the quality of public services in the health and educational 
systems has considerably declined, there is a strong perception in society 
that public sector is overmanned and inefficient. 
The programme of economic reform, one of the Mr Putin’s pre-elective 
documents, includes an administrative reform aimed to increase the quality 
of the public administration and to reduce corruption.40 The reform encom-
passes a raise of salaries together with higher requirements regarding the 
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employees’ qualifications and their higher responsibility. Unfortunately this 
reform has not been started. 
A successful development of the economy provides the government with 
a higher probability of re-election and a larger tax base and therefore the 
government prefers maximum expansion of the advanced sector, conditioned 
on the desired size of the public sector. But taking into account the negative 
utility from the larger public sector for a given budget I argue that in our 
simple model it is socially optimal to make the H-sector as large as possible 
(to maximise k), since it provides high income for the public employees as 
well and make the public sector more efficient and reduces inequality in 
society. 
If we assume that some of the public services performed by the private 
sector are socially optimal, we can consider partial privatisation and hence, 
in terms of our model, partial transformation of the public sector into the 
advanced one. 
Policy affecting technological development 
Assume that the government disposes of external financial sources to 
implement a policy of some sort. The government can support the advanced 
industry’s development by subsidies or cheap credits, or by the instrumen-
tality of non-pecuniary policies, i.e. through alleviating the import of modern 
technologies, removal of bureaucratic barriers, improvement in investment 
legislation, protection of property rights, support of propagation of advanced 
managerial techniques etc. Besides, all measures promoting foreign direct 
investment may also be considered promoting better technologies. 
We know that a higher E reduces H-employment at the expense of the 
public sector, but incomes in both sectors go up. At the same time the wage 
and expected income of shadow sector workers go down and the sector 
becomes larger. We see that technological progress induces reallocation of 
the labour force in favour of the non-commercial sector and thereby 
strengthens the financial base of two law-abiding sectors. Hence, the support 
of the H-sector leads to higher employment in both the shadow and the pub-
lic sectors, with lower growth in the shadow sector. The model’s predictions 
are supported by the experience of developed countries, where technological 
changes have led to a decrease in industrial employment and enlargement of 
all kinds of services. 
Notice that this type of policy is politically quite sensitive since the 
measures that really promote the technological development are not incon-
trovertible, and also that there are some social constraints in the implemen-
tation of this kind of policy. While the government supports the most pros-
perous part of the workforce, and despite improvements for public workers, 
income differentials between the H- and other sectors become wider. Since 
employment in the H-sector is reduced, some of dismissed workers suffer a 
reduction in incomes. 
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The tax policy 
Effects of a higher tax rate strikingly resemble effects of a higher E. The 
model predicts that the higher tax burden depresses the advanced sector’s 
development: employment there goes down and wages go up so that the total 
payroll decreases. The shadow sector rises, but incomes there decline. 
Effects for the public sector are ambiguous: incomes and employment there 
can move in either direction depending on the value of the model’s parame-
ters, but the gap in incomes between the advanced sector workers and the 
rest of the employed becomes wider, i.e. inequality in the economy grows. 
This result looks paradoxical: the government uses taxes as a tool of income 
redistribution. Nevertheless, we see that a higher tax burden makes smaller 
the only sector paying taxes and increases the number of beneficiaries in the 
public sector, whereas the remaining workers in the modern sector receive a 
higher wage than before. Some of these effects are illustrated in Figure 3. 
We see that the greater t increases wages in the two legal sectors, reduces 
employment in the H-sector and incomes in the shadow sector.  
 
 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 The consequences of a shift in the taxation policy. The model 
predicts that a cut in the tax rate brings about a lower ratio k, lower shadow 
employment and a higher wage in the modern sector. 
 
At the beginning of 2001 the Russian government launched an ambitious tax 
reform, which includes a massive tax rates reduction, abolishment of pro-
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gressive personal income taxation together with the introduction of regres-
sivity in the unified social tax. These measures were accompanied by the 
elimination of many tax reliefs, including investment deduction for the profit 
tax. Since only efficient companies in Russia could afford to declare profits, 
and therefore made use of this tax shield and financed their investments from 
the tax savings, they have suffered the most from these measures. 
Therefore, in terms of our model, the government reduced the tax rate t 
and the technological parameter E at the same time, and the model predicts 
that in this case the wage differential in the economy will shrink and the H-
sector employment will increase. The public sector may lose a part of the 
funding and become relatively less attractive than the shadow commercial 
sector. The value of shadow employment increases through both effects and 
then the income differential will contract, but the number of shadow workers 
will become lower. The H-sector comes closer to the rest of the economy. 
Enforcement measures 
The government can intensify control over the shadow sector to make the 
shadow activity riskier and less profitable. Throughout the 1990s the gov-
ernment tended to emphasise the significance of proper administrative meas-
ures against the shadow sector. The model predicts that both employment 
and expected income in the shadow sector positively depend on ξ. Therefore, 
a higher frequency of tax and labour inspections may reduce the attractive-
ness of the sector and make it smaller. Nevertheless, this kind of policies 
may be applied in practice only at a rather limited scale. Inspections require 
huge human and financial resources, and may in turn create a necessity to 
control inspectors and so on.  
Furthermore, the role of the shadow sector for Russia’s economy is rather 
controversial. The shadow sector generates a number of acute social prob-
lems since it does not provide social guarantees, labour safety and control of 
consumers’ rights. On the one hand, it helps to alleviate the situation for 
some groups of the population, such as the unemployed and low-skilled 
workers, and perhaps to create a base for small business development. The 
shadow sector’s existence sends a message to policy makers about the limits 
to which taxation can be pushed. A severe fight against the S-sector, not 
accompanied by other policy measures, will increase the uncertainty in the 
shadow sector, and thus reduce the expected income of the S-sector’s work-
ers and lead to an outflow of workers to the non-commercial sector with a 
following reduction of wages there. Hence the sharp reduction in commer-
cial sector activity will lead to a lower total production and create an exces-
sively heavy burden for the public sector. 
The pension policy 
The pension system of Russia and the arguments for reforming 
The Pension Fund of Russia (PFR) and the network of social security agen-
cies constitute the state pension system in Russia.41 The PFR is responsible 
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for the custody of pension rights, tax collection and pension delivery, and 
has its own budget separated from the federal budget and the regional offices 
responsible for pension collection and delivery in the region. Usually the 
pension contributions are collected and distributed as pension benefits in the 
same region, and the surplus is transferred to the regions with deficits. In 
practice pensioners in the poor regions often suffer from delays in payment, 
whereas PFR offices with superfluous sources prefer to keep their unutilised 
funds and invest them.42 Such investments are not regulated and there are 
misuses in such practice: it happens that money is placed in deposits with 
very low interest rates but at the same time funds are borrowed to pay pen-
sions.  
No government agency exercises operational control over the PFR’s 
activity, and the one instrument of legal external influence is the considera-
tion of the yearly budget of the Fund. The State Duma confirms the budget 
execution for the previous year and fixes the budget for the next simultane-
ously for the Federal and the PFR’s budgets. Therefore, it is quite difficult to 
assess how efficient the PFR is regarding expenses, and deputies usually 
notice too high a level of administrative expenditures, capital investments 
into new offices and equipment, large borrowings to cover temporary cash 
deficits etc. At the request of the World Bank the independent audit of the 
PFR was initially included into the governmental Pension reform pro-
gramme,43 but, due to the activity of the PFR lobby, was stricken off and not 
undertaken. 
The financial sources of the pension system in 1990s were constituted by 
a specialised payroll tax, initially called “compulsory contributions”, that 
was paid by the employers (the main part) and by the employees (the small-
est part) directly to the PFR.44 In 2002 contributions into the PFR and other 
extra-budgetary social security funds (social insurance and health insurance) 
were combined into the unified social tax with an approximately unified tax 
base. The tax rate was set as just the sum of the individual taxes (35.6 per 
cent). 
The PFR is responsible for old age and disability pensions for all retir-
ees45 and pensions for long service for certain categories of workers. Inside 
the general pension schemes there were pension regimes allowing early 
retiring for workers of certain professions, or who worked in the factories 
with harmful labour conditions or lived in remote regions of the country. The 
degree of redistribution between different categories of workers with respect 
to relationship between contributions and payoffs inside the system was very 
high, and it obviously created different types of distortions. 
The pension benefit in the old system was computed according to the 
pension formula relating pension with the length of service and the pre-
retirement wage. The rights acquired in the old system are kept and the old 
pension formula is used in the transition period for the aged generations of 
workers. According to this formula, a retiree is entitled to a retirement bene-
fit equal to the share of her pre-retirement wage for the last five years 
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(replacement ratio), adjusted by the changes in the countrywide average 
wage, multiplied by a coefficient linearly depending upon the length of ser-
vice (not more than 45 years for men and 40 for women). The value of the 
pension is inflation adjusted by the ratio of the country average wage and the 
individual wage, but not greater than 1.2. This result should not exceed the 3 
minimum pensions. 
The procedure of computing the pension is as follows: 
 
1.  Contribution of income A. Average ratio of the individual’s wage and the 
average countrywide wage for the reporting period. This ratio cannot be 
greater than 1.2 (before 2002 it was 0.9).  
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2.  Replacement ratio, the length of service contribution. If the retiree has a 
minimum length of service (25 years for men and 20 years for women), 
the second factor is equal to 0.5. For every year above the minimum this 
factor increases by 0.01, but no more than 0.75 totally.  
Formally, for men: 
 ( )75.0;01.025.0min SB += , where B is a replacement ratio and S is a 
service. 
 
3.  The final pension is equal to the product of two factors, adjusted by the 
growth of the average countrywide wage. 
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wABP c=  
Before introducing the new system the following rules were operative:  
 
1. “Non-insured” periods  
2.  The ceiling for the wage ratio was 0.9.  
 
Some features of the old pension system 
 
1.  The length of service is more important than the income. Increase in a 
service produces much greater increase in the pension value than the pro-
portional increase in the wage, whereas the ceiling for such increases is 
much lower for the wages. To achieve the indifference point, where 
longer service does not affect his pension, a man 60 years old (the official 
pensionable age) should have worked 45 years, i.e. started when he was 
15 years old. If we take into account that such periods as professional 
education, military service etc. were not counted into the length of ser-
vice computation and were returned to just when the whole system was 
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revised, we realise that the limitation above was not binding for many 
Russian retirees. A worker with the same present value of taxed income 
but shorter length of service always necessarily received a smaller pen-
sion. If an individual continues to work after the pensionable age she 
receives her pension in addition to the wage and the length of services 
continues to grow so that the pension value would be recomputed. In 
combination with the very low level of pensions such a system creates 
incentives to work as long as it is otherwise optimal for the person.  
2. We see that the pension cannot exceed 0.75x1.2=0.9 (before 2002 it was 
0.75x0.9=0.675) of the average countrywide wage. In 2001 wages as a 
part of the total incomes of the population constituted about 35.8 per 
cent,46 partly reflecting the scale of tax evasion: a part of labour incomes 
is registered as other incomes. As stated above, actual labour incomes are 
even higher, and it means that the replacement ratio for the pensioners is 
lower than 20 per cent. Considering that by the end of 1998 the average 
pension benefit became just 18 per cent lower than the maximum, we see 
that the vast mass of the well- and even average-paid workers must pay 
higher contributions than the final pension and therefore are not inter-
ested in the public pension system at all. 
3.  According to the law, pensions in the country should be regularly (yearly 
or quarterly if inflation is high) revised in accordance with the average 
wage increase. In the 1990s it was not the case. A high inflation rate and 
poor tax collection led to tremendous misery among the elderly and the 
pensioners with a small pension in 1996 and 1998 got an increase that 
was not stipulated by the pension legislation. Hence a considerable part 
of the pensions became government charity, not mentioned in the pension 
legislation. This increase in the minimum pension led to a situation where 
all ordinary pensioners received almost the same pension.  
Inflation indexation is not also automatic either, and is the subject of 
political haggling. The pension formula does not allow pensions to 
decrease, and before elections and in other politically motivated situa-
tions the authorities tend to increase pensions. The pension legislation 
asserts that the average countrywide wage is established by the govern-
ment in accordance with the statistical data about the wages and the 
employment provided by the Goskomstat. Nevertheless, the PFR refuses 
to accept the value of the average wage presented by the Goskomstat, and 
operates with its own calculations, based on the contributions collected. 
In 1997-98 a treatment of the law with regard to the method of average 
wage computation was the subject of the hottest debate between the State 
Duma and the Pension Fund. The value presented by the PFR was con-
siderably lower than the statistically registered average wage, which in 
turn was lower than the real average by 1.5-2.5 times due to huge tax 
evasion. The PFR ignored the Duma’s opinion and has since then used 
this average wage as a control value, and not the exogenously given. For 
example, when the PFR feels the necessity/possibility to index pensions 
(e.g. for political reasons) it just proclaims that the average wage in the 
country is growing and all pensions are raised correspondingly. Hence, 
despite the clear rules of computing and indexing of pensions their actual 
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size is quite arbitrary. Trust regarding the pension legislation is low: there 
is always a possibility for the government to cut its obligations, especially 
when inflation is high. Actually the level of pensions depends not on the 
legislation but on the financial situation in the PFR. Generally speaking, 
the government pays almost as much as it will. 
4.  Gender differences in Russian society and hence the extent of redistribu-
tion in the pension system are striking. Men in average have considerably 
higher incomes but much lower life expectancy than women (59 years for 
men and 71 for women). The pension age is also different (60 and 55 
years respectively). Thus women are mostly recipients whereas men are 
the main contributors. 
5.  Professional groups are treated differently. Generally, the low level of the 
maximum pension penalises all high-paid workers. In this situation the 
government becomes the subject of pressure to grant privileges for par-
ticular professional groups. For example, the civil pilots’ union required a 
higher pension limit for their members arguing that the replacement ratio 
of retired pilots compared with the average is particularly low. The 
replacement ratio for the registered wages was about 40 per cent in 1998, 
but for pilots it was much lower, about 10 per cent. A lobbying activity 
by the pilots’ union led to the inclusion of pilots in the special pension 
regime for long service, allowing pilots to retire earlier and receive a 
higher pension. Hence some professional groups with good lobbying pos-
sibilities can acquire better terms of pension provision at the expense of 
other groups of workers than the ordinary pension system provides. The 
constant pressure on the Duma from various interests groups requiring 
privileges erodes the system and makes participation in the “universal” 
public pension scheme less attractive for the majority of the population. 
  
Another special pension regime is early retirement for many groups of work-
ers employed in industries with harmful production processes. Their 
employers bore no extra expenses and were actually interested in creating 
new such working places instead of introducing harmless technologies. 
Hence, a well-paid male employed in the ordinary industry without 
privileges is much less interested in participation in the public pension 
scheme than a poorly paid woman with professional privileges. 
The pension reform 
The present pay-as-you-go pension system is unsustainable in a medium-
term perspective because of demographic processes, and the pension reform, 
another major reform on the Russian government’s agenda, was launched in 
the beginning of 2002. The funded element was introduced and the final 
pension benefit now depends on the system’s investment performance. 
The reform was supported by both long-term and short-term considera-
tions. In the long run fast demographic changes in Russia will lead to an 
unbearable burden for the pension system, breaking pension obligations and 
possibly lead to the bankruptcy of the pension system. A low birth rate made 
the population structure very asymmetrical, and in 10-15 years the retired 
generation will be less in size than the working generation and will hardly 
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receive a pension equivalent to the pension they provided to the elderly then 
they worked. Hence the present worker cannot rely on the promises of the 
public pension system, and therefore evades taxes and saves for her old age. 
Young generations observe both the low level of pensions and the weak 
interlink between contributions and the final pension. In this situation most 
Russians resort to individual savings and support from the family. Such 
family traditions are still quite strong in Russia and retired parents usually 
receive some assistance. The importance of the public pension system is 
constantly diminishing. 
The government hopes that the establishment of a funded “pillar” inside 
the state pension system can help reallocate revenues and liabilities more 
evenly in the following decades, but the reform is highly disputed and quite 
controversial. 
The low efficiency of tax collection backs the necessity of changes in the 
fiscal policy. The huge tax evasion diluted the financial basis of the system 
and undermined an ability of the system to pay the bills and to keep the pre-
sent pensioners politically loyal. In the short run the government wishes to 
revitalise the Russian capital market by establishing a large group of institu-
tional investors that constantly manage the assets of the public-funded pen-
sion system and increase tax collection by improving the incentives of tax-
payers to participate in the system. I intend to consider how the changes in 
the system will affect such incentives. 
The demographic and labour market situation decreased the ratio of con-
tributors to beneficiaries, and this ratio will obviously further decline. The 
timing of the reform was especially important to make the reform politically 
affordable. A part of pension revenues is to be diverted to the established 
funded system from the present pensioners, and that is difficult to afford if 
the elderly generation is relatively big. A favourable macroeconomic situa-
tion and high oil prices made the transition quite painless. A gradual increase 
of the share sent to the funded system should allow the present working 
population to accumulate enough to reduce the burden on the smaller future 
generations. 
The main technical tool of the reform is a formal separation of the state 
“pension provision” where benefits depend on a disability to work or other 
characteristics of a beneficiary, and the state “pension insurance”, where 
pensions are a function of the contributions to the system. It is supposed that 
the incentives to pay the “insurance” part of the system will create enough 
financial buoyancy for the system as a whole. Every rouble of contributions 
now is treated equally, i.e. a well-paid worker with shorter service receives 
the same pension as a worker with the same present value of accumulated 
contributions collected for a longer period of time. 
By the logic of the reform the government has a duty to pay just a mini-
mum basic pension and the pension generated by the contributions to the 
quasi-accumulative accounts. The funded part of the pension system is the 
subject of cumbersome and costly regulation but the eventual size of the 
pension depends on the investment performance of managing companies. 
The theoretical literature on the liberal pension reform usually treats the 
compulsory savings mechanism as a tool against people’s myopia. Society as 
a whole, including different generations and individuals, may have different 
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utility discount rates: hence the sum of individual preferences will not result 
in social utility. Consequently some people tend to consume too much from 
the point of view of a social optimum in their young age when the utility of 
money is possibly the highest for them and do not make sufficient savings 
for the future. 
In the welfare state the government cannot abandon poor elderly people 
without support and hence the pension provision may be considered a public 
good and the same argument may be applied: some people will not contrib-
ute to a socially optimal value voluntarily, even if it concerns their own well-
being. They will rather spend their money today being aware that society 
will take care of them later. Such arguments mean that the compulsory sav-
ings system theoretically may be socially superior to voluntary pension sav-
ings. 
 
Revenues and liabilities of the pension system 
Before the reform the employer paid totally to various social funds 38.5 per 
cent of the payroll and the employee paid 1 per cent, the employer deducting 
this sum from the wage. The distribution of payroll tax payments between an 
employee and an employer varies in different countries, but like many 
authors I do not care much how it is formally organised and sum up the 
rates. For our purpose the employee and the employer form coalitions, 
minimising combined tax expenses. At the second stage the partners share 
the resulting payoff in accordance with their bargaining power (equally in 
the Nash bargaining equilibrium case). 
In 2002, instead of separated contributions to different social funds the 
Unified Social Tax (UST) was introduced. The UST (the tax rate is 35.6 per 
cent of the payroll for the overwhelming majority of enterprises) paid by the 
employer is split between various public welfare funds and the federal 
budget (14 per cent of payroll) to fund the social pension and the basic part 
of the insurance pension. The remaining part (14 percent) goes to the Pen-
sion Fund and serves as the financial basis of the “insurance” pensions, 
related to the value of life-time contributions. These 14 per cent are divided 
between a pay-as-you-go system (14, 12 or 8 per cent, according to the age), 
paid to the present pensioners immediately, and the rest is accumulated on 
the insurant’s personal accounts and invested. The former part is booked as a 
“pension capital” of an insurant accumulating on quasi-funded accounts, 
backed by the Fund’s obligations and will be taken from the contributions of 
the future generations. The later part is not included into the public pension 
system anymore. These 2 (or 6) per cent are considered the individual’s 
property, a worker should take investment decisions himself and the gov-
ernment is not responsible for the resulting pension. 
The government recognises that the rate of the UST should be reduced 
and the terms of such a reduction is hotly discussed in the Duma.47 One of 
the proposals with good chances to be adopted is 14 per cent to the PFR 
directly, 6-8 per cent to the federal budget for pension purposes also and 6-8 
per cent to other funds. In this proposal the federal budget and hence the 
financial base for the minimum and social pensions suffer. 
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The only way to somehow restrict pension capital accumulation from 
above is the regressive taxation of high wages. In Figure 4 we can see how 
much the taxpayer must pay to the pension system depending on the labour 
income. Theoretically the marginal tax rate decreases with the greater pay-
roll, but no firms have claimed regressive taxation yet. According to the 
rules of regression the lower tax rate may be applied if the declared average 
wage per worker is higher than 100,000 roubles per year (about 3,330 USD), 
such that 10 per cent of the most-paid workers are eliminated from the com-
putation. Regression aimed to encourage well-paid workers to reveal their 
incomes does not work since it may be applied only if the whole staff of the 
company is paid well above average, and this indicates that the threshold is 
too high. 
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Figure 4. Regressive taxation for the Unified Social Tax 
Source: The Tax Code, part 2.  
 
The new pension formula48 
The resulting pension is computed as the sum of the basic pension paid to 
every pensioner irrespective of wage and the length of service (the value is 
determined by law and equal for everybody), and the differentiated parts 
depending upon the contributions: insurance pension and accumulated pen-
sion. The retiring person is entitled to an insurance pension equal to the 
accrued “pension capital”, the accumulated pension rights, divided by the 
number of the officially expected last 19 years (228 months). If the person 
retires later than the formal pensionable age, the expected pension payment 
period is correspondingly reduced, but not less than 14 years (168 months). 
Nevertheless, the sum of the basic and the insurance parts of the pension 
cannot be less than a certain minimum value. The accumulated part of the 
old-age pension is computed in the same fashion: really accumulated capital 
is spread for the same 19 years. 
Assume a worker at a pensionable age with the opportunity to choose 
between the following options: retire and receive pension, postpone his 
retirement and continue to work or continue to work and start to receive pen-
sion. Since the present legislation allows working and receiving pension the 
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second option may be chosen only if the resulting increase in the pension 
will cover the lost pension for the years from the possible and the actual 
retirement. A postponed pension would be larger due to two effects: larger 
pension capital and lower number of months to divide this pension capital. If 
a worker chooses to receive pension and work simultaneously only the pen-
sion capital will increase. Hence, the second effect should be strong enough 
to make individuals refrain from retiring. Besides the preferences over 
wage/leisure the final decision for an individual depends on the form of his 
wage function. It is often assumed that the wage, lagging behind labour pro-
ductivity, increases first and then decreases. It is not necessarily true for all 
countries and professions, but for Russia it is the realistic picture: elderly 
workers are paid less. Hence we can assume that the wage curve decreases 
for the person over pensionable age and reaches the point where an individ-
ual is indifferent between working and retiring. Ideally, the system should 
work in such a way that everybody who is able to continue working would 
be interested in that. 
The defined contribution pension system imitates real life insurance with 
a usual annuity scheme. Compulsory contributions accumulate in the PFR 
and until the retirement age constitute the property of the insured, but being 
retired this person is entitled to the pension benefit only. (It means that if 
somebody dies a day before retirement her heirs get the accumulated capital, 
the day after they get nothing.) The expected period of pension payment is 
far from actuarially fair. 
These three parts after entitlement would also have different dynamics, 
and the peer representatives of the neighbouring generations with different 
shares of the insurance (non-funded) and accumulated pensions would 
receive quite different pensions, if investment performance considerably 
exceeds the rates of indexation in the quasi-accumulating part of the pension. 
The minimum pension is indexed according to the government’s decisions 
and is highly sensitive politically. Actually, the government will take into 
account how many pensioners would be significantly affected by changes in 
the minimum pension, i.e. poverty among the future elderly. The whole con-
struction of the pension system depends on the size of the minimum pension: 
it cannot be too high to achieve the desired pension differentiation, but can-
not be so low that it makes pensioners starve. Hence it is very difficult to 
predict how the minimum pension will change. 
The second part of the pension is the government’s obligations registered 
as the personal “pension capital”, the part of contributions paid during the 
retiree’s service. This value is adjusted with the growth in the officially 
admitted average wage in the country and at the moment of retirement con-
stitutes the quasi-accumulated pension capital. After the monthly pension is 
computed, it is also adjusted by the growth in the average wage.  
The pension capital actually accumulated on the personal accounts of the 
pensioner (the funded part of the pension) is calculated as the usual annuity: 
the pension capital will grow by the rate of return and diminish by the actual 
payments of pensions. The period of receiving the pension will be deter-
mined legislatively, not by mortality tables. Investment management of the 
public pension assets should be entrusted to a small number of authorised 
investment managers, but until 2004 all the money is invested into the Rus-
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sian government’s bonds and managed by the state-owned Vneshtorgbank, 
also the governmental general agent serving the government bonds.49 The 
government decided that the number of the authorised managing companies 
should be small, and therefore the right to manage the assets of the funded 
pension system becomes the rent, causing wasteful rent seeking between 
large Russian financial groups. The costs of rent seeking will be incumbent 
on the pensioners. 
Investment regulation is cumbersome and costly to comply with, and it 
also deteriorates the efficiency of the new system. New infrastructure 
including the general depositary and specialised managing companies, as 
well as new departments in the Pension Fund responsible for the investments 
should be established. The depositary’s responsibility for errors in book-
keeping must be insured. Officially, expenditures of the funded system may 
exceed 2 per cent of the assets under management. Therefore, in order to 
cover their fixed costs investment managing companies are interested in 
obtaining control over the highest possible amount of pension assets and 
hence maximally limit the number of competitors. 
The investment portfolios are also the subjects of strict regulation.50 So 
far, the only allowed directions of investment are the Russian state securities 
and the mortgage-based bonds issued by the government estate agency. 
Critics say that not all kinds of investments are defensible: placing them in 
domestic state bonds (the main and now the sole investment direction) does 
not change the basic principles of the present system, but leads to higher 
expenditures, while other types of investment in Russia are either too risky 
or too unprofitable. 
But for the government strict investment regulation is the safety belt 
against people’s dissatisfaction if the performance turns out to be poor. 
There is also a self-delusion problem: by rigid and inefficient regulation the 
government inflates the responsibility of the investment managers, and that 
is why investment managers are interested in such regulation. 
Therefore, the system becomes quite complicated for a worker. Both the 
initial level of pension and the ways of inflation adjustment are unclear and 
depend on politics more than economics. The reform does not reduce the 
degree of various types of uncertainty related to the future pension (wage 
growth rate and risk of unemployment, life expectancy, investment risks, 
political risks), and hence for a risk-averse worker the expected value of the 
pension will be lower than its certainty equivalent. The subjective perception 
of risks related to the public pension system may turn out to be higher than 
the alternative risks: risks evasion and personal savings. 
In the new system the resulting pension is the linear function of the dis-
counted total lifetime contribution. The maximum limit is abolished, and 
only if a worker receives quite high wage s/he may pay a slightly less mar-
ginal contribution, but the relationship between accumulated contributions 
and the pension will be the same. 
In the pre-reform pension system there were three categories of workers: 
those entitled to a minimum pension irrespective of declaring the wage; 
high-paid workers receiving the maximum pension and not interested in 
                                                     
49  The scandalous conflict of interests is emphasised by many observers. 
50  The basic legislative base is the Federal law #111-FZ. 
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declaring a value greater than the one providing them the maximum pension; 
and the intermediate type of workers with a pension depending on the con-
tributions. It was shown that the intermediate case was not overwhelming at 
all in Russia due to the quite narrow range between minimum and maximum 
limits. 
The previous pension system promoted the long length of service and 
confined the maximum wage that matters for the pension on a quite low 
level. Taking into account that professional education was excluded from the 
computation of the length of service, the old system supported poorly paid 
people with low education, who started to work early in their youth. Their 
returns from the pension system were the largest, and their pensions were 
often greater than the pensions of the well-paid employees. This situation 
was abolished by the new system. Not the length of service alone but the 
total value of accumulated contributions determines the size of pensions.  
The reform cancelled the maximum pension, possibly making the minimum 
pension lower than otherwise and hence increases the number of workers 
with a pension related to their declared wages. Other things being equal, the 
new system should create incentives for such workers to declare their wages. 
Better tax compliance via direct interest of workers and employers in the 
resulting pension was proclaimed the main short-term aim of the reform. 
How actually does the reform affect legalisation of the shadow labour rela-
tionships? 
Consider two cases: 1.The coalition of employees and employer has an 
opportunity to evade taxation and pays the tax only if it is profitable for it. 2. 
The coalition cannot fully escape taxation and uses legal or semi-legal 
schemes to minimise tax expenses. Such schemes usually involve declaring 
labour incomes as other types of personal incomes of the workers. 
In the first case gains from revealing their shadow incomes are certainly 
insufficient to cover an increasing tax burden. By declaring their payroll the 
coalition must pay 35.6 per cent of the Unified Social Tax and 13 per cent of 
personal income tax. From the 28 per cent of the Social Tax one half gener-
ates some obligations regarding future pension. 12 per cent (8 for a worker 
with the birth year later than 1967) back the government obligations to the 
present pensioners, but are booked as personal “pension capital”, the gov-
ernment obligations to the pensioner. 2 or 6 correspondingly per cent of the 
payroll are invested on behalf of the pensioner. Hence, if we imagine that the 
worker would have invested this money voluntarily anyway, we can say that 
part of the taxpayer’s money is back.51 Hence, at best the reform is equiva-
lent to the reduction of the tax rate (for workers younger than 37 years it may 
mean 6 per cent). After the reform every pensioner knows exactly which part 
is pure taxation and which is the contribution to her pension capital. In other 
words, a contributor’s productive investments are heavily taxed. Hence, even 
if 14 per cent from the almost 50 per cent are managed efficiently and a 
worker would like to trust her money to the government anyway to provide 
                                                     
51  Assume that if the taxpayer has had the right to decide, she would form some investment 
portfolio anyway, not less than the obligatory savings inside the funded pension system. 
His investment preferences can also coincide with the government’s ones, and the 
management-related expenses also should be incurred. 
Suggested policies and their implications 55 
her retirement benefit, tax evasion costs should be too high to make tax 
compliance profitable. 
Besides purely shadow firms there are numerous firms applying legal or 
semi-legal schemes to minimise the total tax bill. Some of the schemes allow 
reducing payroll taxation but simultaneously generate other tax liabilities.52 
Now we see a distribution of firms that differ in the costs of evasion from the 
payroll tax and the gains from participation in the pension system (due to 
e.g. such characteristics as a type of the industry, a size, an age or gender 
structure of the workers). Hence, for them even small favourable shifts in the 
payroll taxation may make evasion from this tax less rewarding and consid-
erably increase their compliance via a switch for some other method of tax 
optimisation. They may just switch for a system supposing payments of the 
payroll taxes in full. The issue is how beneficial the changes in the pension 
system are. 
The possible explanation of the shadow sector inertia is the costs of tran-
sition. Many enterprises have well established tax evasion schemes related 
with “black-cash”, double bookkeeping etc. The decision to reveal the per-
sonnel’s payroll may not be taken in isolation from policies towards evasion 
from other taxes, relationships with suppliers and contractors, as well as tax 
inspectors and other officials, and criminals. Therefore, a company may not 
switch for a transparent wage policy due to the costs of transition even if it is 
otherwise profitable. The costs of transition include among other things the 
potential costs of switching back, the special case of the well-known ratchet 
effect. 
Enormous redistribution among the various groups of workers inside the 
Russian pension system was a serious challenge for the reform, resulting in a 
compromise: the scope of redistribution was just somewhat reduced. 
Let us consider how the reform dealt with gender redistribution.53 The 
main source of inequality, different retirement age for men and women, is 
kept. Since the pension capital is accumulated during the whole working life 
women partly lose their advantage over men, since if they like to retire at the 
official pensionable age, they will get a lower pension, even if their wage 
was equal.54 Nevertheless, women’s greater life expectancy together with a 
lower retirement age means the continuation of heavy redistribution inside 
the system towards women. So, if a woman and a man with equal wages and 
length of service retire simultaneously at the age of 60, they will be entitled 
to different pensions, since the man’s “pension capital” will be divided into 
19 “actuarially computed” years, but for the woman it will be 14 years. 
Hence, such a male pensioner receives a smaller pension for a shorter period 
of time than a female pensioner does. 
Such redistribution inside the pension system somehow compensates the 
general wage inequality between men and women in their active years and 
the time that women bear and bring up children, but yet discourages men 
from participation in the system. 
                                                     
52  A company may make payments to the workers from the after-tax profits (like dividends). 
Such payments are not levied by payroll taxation, but are costly from the point of view of 
profit taxation. 
53  About gender redistribution see e.g. Baskakov (1999). 
54  In the old system they paid during a shorter period but the pension was computed based 
on the same five pre-retirement years as for men. 
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Implications for the labour market model 
Summing up the measures of the pension reform for purposes of our model: 
 
1. The pension formula is to be revised: benefits must be computed on the 
base of contributions paid, but not the wage; 
2. The same is applied to the length of service: periods without contribu-
tions (leaves, time of education etc.) are not reckoned in; 
3. The pension differential has to be larger; 
4. The retirement age may be increased; 
5. Resources for establishment of the funded system should be partly 
diverted from the current pensioners and partly from the state budget. 
 
The two first measures close the opportunity to cheat on the social security 
by switching between legal and shadow employment, which is possible 
when the benefit computation is based on the last pre-retired years of ser-
vice. One should not earn the shadow sector wage and at the same time a 
legal sector pension. This brings more realism to the model. 
The worker counts on a higher pension, which makes legal employment 
more valuable. It becomes important to receive registered and taxed wages 
because a larger gap between the minimum and maximum extremes 
increases the probability of obtaining an “interior” pension, which depends 
on a wage. A higher pension benefit in the public sector because of the 
migration equilibrium condition leads to higher wages in the S-sector and 
correspondingly lowers employment in the S-sector. 
If subsidies to the funded pension system are taken not from the higher 
taxes but from other sources, then the government needs to reduce other 
expenditures. Hence the public workers receive only a fraction of the taxes 
paid by the H-sector, and the remaining taxes go to the pensions in all the 
sectors. Since now the pension of public workers is a linear function of the 
wage, and H-workers receive part of their taxes back, the total effect is 
similar to a lower tax rate with the same effects for income and employment. 
Since the size of the advanced sector does not depend on the pension 
system, a higher pension differentiation ratio makes the total income differ-
ential with the remaining sectors even greater. Notice that the differential 
with the shadow sector will grow the least. 
An increase in the retirement age makes actuarially computed pensions 
lower and work earnings more valuable, even if the monthly pension would 
be higher, and therefore it benefits shadow employment. 
Adjustment in pension parameters leads to different outcomes depending 
on the particular size of the wage and the pensions. An increase in the pen-
sion differential makes work in the H-sector more rewarding; thus S-sector 
employment is increasing: the higher income of the H-sector’s worker 
attracts some individuals to the commercial sector from the public one. An 
increase in the minimum pension alone raises employment in the public and 
the shadow sector, since it makes advanced sector jobs relatively less attrac-
tive. 
It has been shown that the higher pension parameters increase the value 
of employment in every sector, but least of all in the public one, and besides, 
public workers do not gain from the higher maximum pension. The public 
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sector becomes less attractive and S-sector employment grows with higher 
pension parameters. This paradoxical result is produced by that fact that pen-
sions in both sectors are rigid and do not depend on the legally declared 
wage. Therefore, a higher minimum pension creates incentives for tax eva-
sion, since legal employment is not rewarding with respect to pension. 
To discuss possible interpretations of these changes in the pension system 
terms we need to make some extension of the basic model, where we con-
sidered a pretty simple structure of pension benefits. Workers in the H-sector 
receive the highest pension and other workers get the low one. This simpli-
fying assumption does not affect the result significantly since the extreme 
values of pensions in Russia prevail. Pensions do not differ in the P- and S-
sectors and workers do not take them into consideration making employment 
decisions. 
Nevertheless, according to the law the pension is a linear function of the 
average wage for the last several years of service and does not change with 
the wage with the exemption of the latter going beyond the limits. In today’s 
Russia the difference between the two limits is so small that the constraints 
are almost always binding, yet this is a particular feature of the present 
situation and is not going to last. 
We can extend the model to allow pension benefit to change with the 
wage, but keep the source of pensions exogenous. Hence the worker receives 
either the minimum pension S or the maximum pension S , or the share of 
her current wage bwH, where b is a replacement ratio of the pension system. 
The pension system differentiation ratio r is the quotient of the minimum 
and maximum pensions and is fixed by the pension legislation as 4, although 
it is actually lower in practice. Therefore, the value of a pension benefit is: 
 
  max( ;min( , ))Hpension benefit S bw rS=                                  (17) 
In terms of the option theory this worker’s option position may be 
defined as a “Bullish vertical spread”,55 which combines one bought and one 
written European call-options. The strike of the purchased option is S and the 
strike of the written is Sr. Workers are concerned only about the value of the 
total position, which is equal to the difference between the values of the 
bought and written call-options. 
The value of the pension option positively depends upon the government 
pension scheme parameters b, S and r, the interest rate of the alternative 
investment σ, the wage w and the remaining period of work before retire-
ment d. The latter is determined by the age of the worker and the official 
retirement age. Thus, the pension benefit may be presented as follows: 
 
),,,,,( dwbrSBP σ=    P1>0,  P2>0,  P3>0,  P4>0,  P5>0, P6>0. 
 
Russian pension legislation sets the limits for changes of b depending on the 
length of service. Maximum b is equal to 0.75 and most of the people in 
Russia get the maximum replacement ratio. Then 
 
                                                     
55  The option theory and it application to the non-marketable options see Cox and 
Rubinstein (1985), Hull and Murphy (1998), McDonald and Siegel (1984). 
Leonid Andreev 58 
0.75h HrS B W> =  
0.75H
rSw ≤
 
So, the derivative of the pension option w.r.t. wage is not a continuous 
function and takes the following form: 
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The marginal earnings on pension due to the increase in the minimum 
pension are positive if the pension is equal to one the extreme values and 
zero otherwise. 
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If the marginal earnings on pension due to the increase in the possible spread 
in pensions (Sfixed, Smax increased) is less then the discount factor then we 
obtain the negative sign of the derivative. 
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Consider the employment value in the three sectors again. Assume now that 
the H-sector worker obtains either a maximum pension or the pension as a 
linear function of the wage, and the public sector worker obtains either a 
minimum pension or a function of the wage. 
 ( ){ }HHH wSrwbV ++= ;1min  
( ){ }SwwbV PPP ++= ;1max  
A worker in the shadow sector still obtain the minimum wage: 
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( ){ }[ ]SwwSrwbhSwV SHHSS −−++++= ξξ ;1min  
In comparison with equations 6-8 all the employment values, except the S- 
one, may not depend on the pension parameters S and r. Consider the most 
plausible case: the wage of the advanced sector workers is high enough to 
give entitlement to the maximum pension as before but a worker in the 
public sector receives a pension equal to bwp. The effects of the pension 
parameters now are even more pronounced: the higher minimum pension S 
keeps VP untouched, but increases VH and VS. The public sector becomes 
even less rewarding compared with the shadow sector and shadow employ-
ment grows with a higher S. 
Another type of extension is heterogeneity of the firms and workers con-
cerning the pension system. In our model all the firms belonging to one of 
the three sectors are homogeneous, as well as the labour force in the econ-
omy. If we allow the workers and the firms to be different with respect to 
costs of evasion and gains from the pension system, the coalition between 
firms and employees will solve the problem according to the tax optimisa-
tion problem and the solution with depend upon the individual interplay 
between gains and costs. Hence, for some distribution of firms any changes 
in the parameters lead to shifts in the number of evading firms. 
It was presumed that too high tax rates and a levelling of the pensions for 
everybody cause low tax compliance. According to the tax authorities, 
arrears for personal tax and the UST were reduced to about 10 per cent in 
2002.56 Even if we attribute all the improvements in tax collection to the tax 
and pension reforms, this result is quite modest. We have seen that the 
reform has not produced strong enough incentives to transit to the legal 
labour relationships. Private savings are much more efficient than the public 
pension scheme, and the evasion costs are generally not high. Generally 
people do not trust the public pension system and the government needs a 
quite long while to build up the pension system’s reputation. Firmness of the 
pension liabilities is the prerequisite of the reform’s success, and the gov-
ernment must commit itself not to worsen the pension legislation for the pre-
sent contributors in the future. It creates a well-known game-theoretic situa-
tion: the government cannot credibly commit not to change pension legisla-
tion and the worker, being aware of this, does not declare her wage. 
We see that the government, under certain stipulations, has an opportu-
nity to tailor an efficient policy to achieve specific goals in employment and 
income distribution by applying some combination of different policy 
instruments. 
I should make the reservation that while talking about the government we 
do not take into account the existence of different levels of government, as 
they may not be well co-ordinated. For example, the pension system is run 
by the Federal Pension Fund, while taxation and public employment are 
partly under the jurisdiction of local authorities. Therefore, the regional gov-
ernment will solve the problem considering the pension system’s parameters 
given. 
 
                                                     
56  Tax Collection Ministry (2002). 

Conclusion 
The aim of the report is to highlight the most striking features of the Russian 
labour market: adjustment without large unemployment, persistence of the 
shadow sector, swelling of the public employment. A three-sector static 
model in the Harris-Todaro tradition has been provided. The model sheds 
light on the mechanism of labour force reallocation between different sectors 
in the closed regional economy, shows how workers make decisions con-
cerning their employment in different sectors and gives some predictions 
about the possible labour market policy consequences. The influences of 
different parameters on wages and employment in the economy have been 
derived. On this basis the policymaker may design the policy tailored to the 
particular politically or socially motivated needs.  
It has been shown that the effect of any labour policy depends on the par-
ticular parameters of development of the labour market. For instance, strict 
administrative measures against the shadow sector may cause reduction in 
total production, exaggerate the labour market situation and increase income 
inequality in the economy.  
We have seen that the shadow economy problem is closely connected to 
the slenderness of the advanced sectors in the economy, the high tax rate due 
to high governmental commitments, weak unions and the legal system, 
unsound social security etc. Due to complexity of the problem the govern-
ment cannot overcome the shadow sector’s problem by a single strong 
measure. For example, since the beginning of the 2001 the radical changes in 
the payroll taxes structure and rates have been implemented, but they did not 
promote any energetic growth in taxpayers’ compliance for a decline in eco-
nomic activity concealment.  
Encouragement of honest taxpayers by reduction in tax rates increases the 
number of honest companies, but the reform should be supported by pro-
gress in everyday taxation practice, better work of the legal system, lowering 
of the administrative barriers for business. The success of any policy of this 
kind will also heavily depend on the real content of other scheduled reforms: 
new labour legislation, pension and administrative reform etc. 
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Proof of Proposition 1: 
1. Since we know the sign of
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t
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Taking the derivative of Q w.r.t. t yields us: 
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. 
We see that the payroll tax rate affects the employment share of the 
H-sector negatively.  
2.  Using the implicit function we can put down the expression for 
dt
dk
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To be greater than one in absolute value of the numerator of A must be 
greater than the denominator, i.e. the difference between its numerator and 
denominator must be positive. For convenience the whole expression is 
divided into three parts: 
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is proved to be greater than the unity on the whole 
domain.  
Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Proposition 2: 
Applying the same logic, as in the previous proposition we have: 
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The derivative of Q w.r.t. E: 
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To determine the sign of the whole expression we consider again the 
signs of its parts: 
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By the same logic we compare the numerator and the denominator of the 
expression and for the sake of clearness we divide this difference into three 
parts: 
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The sign of the expression depends on the relative magnitude of the 
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Proof of lemma 2: 
1) By assumption kt is always smaller than 1, the employment premium 
in the H-sector is strictly positive and the wage in the H-sector is kt1  times 
higher than the public sector wage.  
 
Partial derivatives with respect to k and t yield:  [ ]
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If we assume t = 0,5, then 
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k 1;0 , and hence ( )2;0∈k . 
Since 0),(' <EkR k , ( , )tR k E >0, we see that the sign depends on the 
comparative magnitudes of the first and the second terms in the numerator.  
For the derivatives to be positive the following expression must hold: 
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where ϑ  is the elasticity of employment premium w.r.t. ratio k. 
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Nevertheless, we can check the sign for the chosen function of the 
form kEeR λ−= satisfying the model’s assumptions. Here kλϑ = and 
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Therefore, for this form of function both wages grow with the higher 
k. 
 
2) By taking the partial derivatives of the wage and the expected 
income with respect to the employment ratio k we find that 
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Using the model assumptions it remains to show under what condi-
tions we can get ( ) 0' ≤+−++− hSSrwwg HSwH ξ  to assure a negative 
sign of 
k
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∂
. 
Substituting for h=LH=g: 
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( ) HHSw LSSrwwg H ≤−++−ξ'   
The first term of the expression may be presented as the change in 
probability of transition from S- to H-employment:
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and the second term is a gain from such a transition.  
Therefore the condition may be reorganised as:  
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Q.E.D. 
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Summary57 
The report discusses the main peculiarities of the Russian labour market, 
such as the relatively low unemployment, the prevailing shadow labour rela-
tionships and the overmanning in the public sector. The three-sectoral model 
of the Russian labour market was developed in order to describe a developed 
urban economy with a closed regional labour market with various employ-
ment opportunities for a worker. A solution to the model provides us with 
the opportunity to make some predictions concerning labour market behav-
iour in the changing environment; in particular, how basic characteristics of 
the market respond to different policies that can be implemented by the gov-
ernment. The impact on the labour market of various reforms implemented 
by the Russian government is examined, with special stress on the conse-
quences of the pension reform. 
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